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CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES, THE
CONSTITUTION AND A NATIONAL
COURT OF APPEALS
By Kevin L. Domecus*
Introduction
Reform of the federal judiciary historically has been a long and
arduous process, marked by slow recognition of the need for change,
endless debates on the wisdom of any proposals, and such interminable
delays in obtaining reform that any changes resemble emergency relief.
The "caseload crisis"' of recent years may mark the beginning of yet
another episode in that lengthy process. As federal court filings at every
level continue to increase,2 the judicial system shows greater symptoms
of strain. Recent years have witnessed the call for abolition of all
mandatory appeals to the Supreme Court, a larger role for judicial
alternatives,' and division of the existing eleven circuit courts of ap-
peals' into new circuits of smaller geographic area, but the most struc-
turally significant proposals are those calling for a National Court of
Appeals (NCA), which is intended to be an appellate level interposed
between the present circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.
* Member, second-year class.
1. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT] and U.S. COMMISSION ON
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCE-
DURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA REPORT].
2. See notes 120-26 and accompanying text infra.
3. The abolition of direct Supreme Court appeal from all three judge court decisions was
accomplished by recent legislation which preserved such an appeal only in cases challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of legislative districts. On Aug. 12, 1976, Congress passed
Public Law 94-381, repealing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2282 and amending §§ 2284 and 2403, abol-
ishing most three-judge courts and thus direct appeals from those courts to the Supreme Court.
See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2281, 2282, 2284, 2403 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Puro, United States Magistrates: A New Federal Judicial Officer, 2 JUST. SYS. J.
141 (1976); Note, Compulsory JudicialArbitration in Calfornia: Reducing the Delay and Expense of
Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTINGS- L.J. 475 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Commission Recommends Splitting F#t2h and Ninth Circuits to Create Two New
Federal Appellate Circuits, 60 A.B.A.J. 209 (1974); Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the "New" Na-
tional Court of Appeals: Can the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839 (1976).
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The very idea of an NCA raises numerous policy questions, but the
sole issue for this note is whether implementation of the court would be
a constitutionally valid exercise of congressional power.
While a National Court of Appeals has been discussed in various
forms since 1971,6 there have been two recent major proposals, one
from the Federal Judicial Center Study Group on the Caseload of the
Supreme Court (the Freund Study Group) and the other from the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (the
Hruska Commission). The Freund proposals were extensively criti-
cized,7 and their wide-ranging suggestions have served as little more
than a basis for discussion. The Hruska Commission's proposal for a
National Court was much less controversial, and although it too has
been criticized,8 versions of the proposal are currently before the judici-
6. See, e.g., FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-24; HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-
39; Griswold, Rationing Justice-the Supreme Court's Caseload and hat the Court Does Not Do,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Griswold]; Leventhal, .4 Modest Proposalfor
a Multi-Circuit Court fAppeals, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 881 (1975).
7. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL ViEw 50-53 (1973); Alsup, 4
Policy Assessment of the National Court fAppeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); Black, The
National Court fAppeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Black]; Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of4ppeals Proposal 'Fundamentally Unnec-
essary and l-Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973); Brennan, The National Court of4ppeals: Another
Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brennan ]: Gressman, The Constitu-
tion v. The Freund Report, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 951 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gressman 1];
Gressman, The National Court ofAppeals: - Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Goldberg, One
Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14; Meredith, The Supreme Court of the
United States andthe ProposedNational Court ofAppeals, 29 J. Mo. B. 441 (1973); Poe, Schmidt &
Whalen, 4 National Court of4ppeals:A -Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 842 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Poe, Schmidt & Whalen]; Stokes, National Court ofAppeals: An Alternative Proposal,
60 A.B.A.J. 179 (1974); Warren, .4 Response to Recent Proposals to Dilute the Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 20 Loy. L. Rav. 221 (1974); Warren, Let's Not Weaken the Supreme Court, 60
A.B.A.J. 677 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Warren ]; Warren, The Proposed New "National Court of
Appeals", 28 REc. A. B. N.Y. 627 (1973); Retired Chie/Justice Warren .4ttacks, Chie/Justice Bur-
ger De/ends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposals, 59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Warren & Burger]; Note, National Court ofAppeals Composition, Constitutionality and
Desirability, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 863 (1973); Comment, National Court ofAppeals: Freund or
Foe, 21 Loy. L. REv. 171 (1975); Note, The National Court fAppeals:.A Constitutional "Inferior
Court", 72 MICH. L. REv. 290 (1973) [hereinafter cited as National Court]; Note, Proposed Na-
tional Court ofAppeals.-A Critical Analysis, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 904 (1974). But see A. BICKEL,
THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1973) [hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL]; Warren & Bur-
ger, supra, at 724-30; Freund, Why We Needthe National Court ofAppeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Freundi]; Freund, National Court ofAppeals, 25 H kSTINGS L.J. 1301 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Freund 11]; Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of
Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973); Note, National Court of 4ppeals: . Qualfied Concurrence, 62
GEo. L.J. 881 (1974).
8. See Hearings be/ore the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate Syster
Second Phase, 2 vols. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings I and Hearings 11] (Remarks of Bell,
Hearings II, supra at 677; remarks of Friendly, supra at 1311; remarks of Goldberg, supraat 1317;
remarks of Gressman, supra at 1319); Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal ofthe Hruska Commis-
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ary committees of both houses of Congress.'
There are three substantial constitutional issues that present signif-
icant threshold problems to this type of structural reform. The initial
consideration is whether the implementation of a National Court of
Appeals would violate the constitutional proviso for "one supreme
Court." The second issue arises from the congressional power to create
"inferior" courts, focusing on whether a National Court of Appeals
would be sufficiently inferior to fall within the scope of that authority.
The final question is whether constitutional power given to Congress to
make "exceptions and regulations" to federal court jurisdiction in-
cludes the power to create an NCA.
Many commentators have resolved any one or all of these
problems in the negative, arguing that any denial of ultimate Supreme
Court review would either violate the "oneness" of the Supreme
Court10 or exceed congressional authority to create only "inferior"
courts.' The critics also claim that congressional authority under the
exceptions and regulations clause of article III is not plenary and can-
not be invoked to restrict any broad, traditional Supreme Court func-
tions such as the right to review all cases arising in the federal system.12
When viewed against the complete history of the federal court sys-
tem, however, these constitutional criticisms seem rather provincial,
shaped more by recently developed conceptions about the function of
sion to Establish a National Court ofAppeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 431 (1976); Feinberg, National
Court ofAppeals, 42 BRooKLYN L. REV. 580 (1976); Haworth, supra note 5, at 840; Owens, The
Hruska Commissions rProposed National Court ofAppeals, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 580 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Owens]; Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals.- A Threat to Judicial
Symmetr.y, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976). But see Hruska, Commission Recommends New National Court
of Appeals, 61 A.B.A.J. 819 (1975); Hrska, The National Court of Appeals: An Analysis of
Vewpoints, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 286 (1975); Levin, Do We Need a New National Court?, 12
TRIAL 32 (1976); Rosenberg, Enlarging the Federal Court'r Capacity to Settle the National Law, 10
GONZ. L. REv. 709 (1975).
9. H.R 3969, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976); S. 3423, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
10. See, e.g., Black, supra note 7, at 885-86; Gressman I, supra note 7, at 959-64; Poe,
Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 7, at 855.
11. National Court, supra note 7, at 304-05.
12. See Hearings I1, supra note 8, at 1319 (remarks of Gressman); Gressman 1, supra note 7,
at 966-68; National Court, supra note 7, at 305-08. See generally Blumstein, The Supreme Court's
Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. Rav. 895
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Blumstein]; Hart, The Power ofCongress to Limit the Jurisdiction ofthe
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rv. 1362 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Hart];
Lenoir, Congressional Control Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 5 KAN. L.
REV. 16 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Lenoir]; Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Juris-
diction ofthe Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 157 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Ratner]. See also
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 229, 259-61 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Van Alstyne].
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the Supreme Court than by the original Supreme Court role in the gov-
ernmental plan. The judicial activism of the last thirty years may have
created a notion that the Supreme Court must see every case, vindicate
every injustice, correct every questionable decision and write every fi-
nal opinion, a conclusion without historical support or even current va-
lidity. Yet, constitutional objections to a National Court of Appeals
arguably are premised more on preserving an idyllic role for the
Supreme Court than on valid constitutional principles.
Separating the proper role of the Supreme Court from the various
popular conceptions regarding its functions requires a thorough histori-
cal analysis of both the original purpose and operation of the federal
courts and their eventual historical development. Such an analysis will
demonstrate the potential for change and accommodation that has be-
come an enduring characteristic of the federal court system, a feature
that has not only provided impetus for past reforms but which also will
enable proposed structures such as a National Court of Appeals to pass
constitutional muster. Part I of this note examines the inception of the
federal court system and its growth and reform, starting with the fram-
ing of the Constitution and progressing through the major Judiciary
Acts and various other court reforms. This analysis provides a more
accurate picture of the original design of the court system. Part II de-
scribes the Freund and Hruska plans for a National Court of Appeals,
and Part III discusses each specific constitutional question raised by the
creation of a National Court.
The historic pattern of slow response to the need for judicial re-
form will probably never be changed, and such a deliberate approach
may be a wise course when dealing with such a well-entrenched gov-
ernmental branch. The purpose of this note is to show that the current
pattern should not be encumbered by constitutional objections to struc-
tural changes that are based upon misconceptions of the role of the
federal appellate court system. The federal courts were designed to
meet the contemporary needs of a changing population, and these
twentieth-century needs should not be frustrated by a restrictive read-
ing of the Constitution that refuses to consider both pragmatic concerns
and historical developments.
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I. Growth And Reform Of The Federal Courts
A. The Inception of the Constitution
The Constitution, in article III, provides the basic framework of
the federal judiciary. 13 Section One vests the judicial power in "one
supreme Court" and other inferior courts as Congress sees fit to estab-
lish, and provides for judicial tenure and compensation. Section Two
sets forth jurisdictional guidelines, defining the Supreme Court's origi-
nal and appellate jurisdiction and giving Congress the power to make
exceptions and regulations to the latter. The article is markedly bereft
of any detail regarding the structure or function of the courts.
The constitutional skeleton acquires additional, albeit limited,
shape through an examination of the records of both the constitutional
convention and the state ratifying conventions.1 4 The constitutional
convention is of primary importance as the occasion where all of the
language was ostensibly debated before it was drafted. However, as
stated by Max Farrand, a primary chronicler of the convention, "to one
who is especially interested in the judiciary, there is surprisingly little
on the subject to be found in the records of the convention."' 5 All the
plans calling for a judicial department contained a provision for a
Supreme Court, 6 but the specific language calling for one High Court
and other inferior courts, later a source of controversy surrounding
NCA proposals, were passed without substantial debate. However, the
exceptions and regulations clause was revised in both the committee on
detail and the convention at large, and the significance of these changes
has been the subject of considerable comment. One critic has con-
cluded that the framers intended to limit the congressional power to
alter the appellate jurisdiction.17 However, the convention as a whole
13. The relevant portions of article III read as follows:
§ 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish ....
§ 2, cl. 2. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions, as the Congress shall make.
14. See THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (5 vols.) (2d ed. J. Elliot 1881) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT's DEBATES];
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (6 vols.) (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter
cited as FARRAND].
15. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1913).
16. See I FARRAND, supra note 14, at 21, 244, 292; 2 id. at 432, 3 id. at 600.
17. Gressman I, supra note 7, at 964-68; Hearings 11, supra note 8, at 1321 (remarks of
Gressman).
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never debated the merits of an exceptions and regulations clause 8 be-
cause none had been included in the original plans for a judiciary.' 9
The exceptions clause was not proposed until the meeting of the com-
mittee on detail, a group charged with writing the precise constitutional
language.20 While specific details as to events in that committee are not
clear, its members did reject one clause which provided that "judicial
power shall be exercised in such manner as the legislature shall di-
rect."'' 2 In its place, the committee substituted the present language,
allowing that "the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make. 22 The committee then added lan-
guage to follow the exceptions and regulations clause which provided
that "[tlhe Legislature may assign any part of the [court's original or
appellate] jurisdiction above mentioned. . . in the manner, and under
the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it
shall constitute from time to time."'2 3 However, when article III was
voted on by the whole convention, the delegates rejected that latter lan-
guage regarding jurisdictional assignment, leaving the present excep-
tions clause to stand by itself.24
The Federalist Papers,25 while representing the best example of
1780 constitutional philosophy, provide little assistance in defining pre-
cise terms in article III. Alexander Hamilton, the author of the relevant
articles, sought to assure the states that their interests would not be
abused by an unbridled federal judiciary.26 Hamilton thus guaranteed
-that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and as to
fact, would not emasculate the finality of state court jury verdicts 7 and
argued at length that inferior federal courts were a better mechanism
18. See J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, in 1 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 240 (P. Freund ed. 1971); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 20 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
19. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 14, at 146-47, 157, 172-73, 186, 424-25, 430-31, 434, 437; 4
id. at 47-48. See generally Gressman I, supra note 7, at 966; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at
20.
20. 2 FARRAND, supra note 14, at 146-47.
21. Id. at 425.
22. Id. at 424-25, 430-31, 434, 437.
23. Id. at 186-87.
24. Id. at 430-32.
25. THE FEDERALIST NoS. 78-83 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as
THE FEDERALIST].
26. Seeid. No. 81, at 506-09; No. 82, at 512-13.
27. Id. No. 81, at 509-10.
L .....
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for federal claims than state courts.28 Hamilton did refer to the inferior
courts as being subordinate to the Supreme Court,29 but did not give
any details regarding what such subordinancy would actually entail.
The proposals regarding a federal judiciary were not a major con-
cern of the various state ratifying conventions. The major points at is-
sue, lack of the guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, appellate
jurisdiction both as to law and fact, and diversity jurisdiction, shed lit-
tle light on the motivations underlying article III terminology.
30
One significant inference from the state conventions comes from a
debate in Virginia over the wisdom of giving Congress power to create
inferior federal courts.31 Patrick Henry had objected that such a power
might eventually lead to a system that undermined the structure of the
state courts.32 Henry preferred that the state courts be utilized as the
inferior courts. Edmund Pendleton answered first:
He objects that there is an unlimited power of appointing inferior
courts. I refer to that gentleman, whether it would have been proper
to limit this power. Could those gentlemen who framed that instru-
ment have extended their ideas to all the necessities of the United
States, and seen every case in which it would be necessary to have an
inferior tribunal?
33
John Marshall added: "I own that the power of creating a number of
courts is, in my estimation, so far from being a defect, that it seems
necessary to the perfection of this system."'34 Although these replies,
made only in Virginia by two of the foremost advocates of the Consti-
tution, cannot be accepted as the single absolute embodiment of origi-
nal intentions, they are significant in their articulation of the forward-
looking perspective that pervaded the constitutional conventions.
The search for the original meaning of article III terminology is in
many ways a futile exercise. There are hints as to the proper scope of
federal juridiction, the congressional power to create inferior courts
and to make exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction, but the context of the debates is very remote from any
current controversies. Nevertheless, a general notion of the intended
28. Id. No. 80, at 495; No. 81, at 506-07.
29. Id. No. 81, at 505-06.
30. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 446-47, 519, 521-29, 532-36, 539-46, 549,
551-57, 570-72 (Virginia Convention); 1 id. at 322-23, 326 (Massachusetts & New Hampshire
Conventions). See .generaly Frank, Historical Bases o/the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1948); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 21-23.
31. See 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 14, at 544-53.
32. Id. at 539-46.
33. Id. at 547.
34. Id. at 553.
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role of the judicial branch in the governmental system is important and
is somewhat more ascertainable than any definitive explanation of con-
stitutional terms. While some of the state convention material does in-
dicate a broad plan for potential court construction,3 5 the true
intentions of the framers are best gleaned from their own implementa-
tion of the judicial machinery.
B. The Judiciary Act of 1789
The Judiciary Act of 178936 has been the single most important
judicial legislation ever adopted by Congress. Its provisions were sig-
nificant in two main respects; first, the 1789 Act set an organizational
blueprint for the federal court system which has survived in essence to
the present, and second, the Act, enacted shortly after the constitutional
convention, provides perhaps the most accurate reflection of the fram-
ers' plans for the federal judiciary.37 The Act established a tri-partite
system of federal courts, with the Supreme Court at the top, circuit
courts in the middle, and district courts at the bottom.3 8 The Supreme
Court was composed of one Chief Justice and five associate justices,
while the circuit courts, originally numbering three, were each staffed
by two Supreme Court justices and one district court judge.3 9 This ba-
sic system, altered only by increases in the number of districts, the
number of circuits and the number of members of the circuit and
Supreme Courts, is still in effect today.4°
The first Judiciary Act did not give the lower courts extensive ju-
risdiction. The district courts had jurisdiction over admiralty cases,
41
seizures following shipping violations,42 suits against consuls,43 suits by
the federal government in matters involving less than $10044 and some
criminal cases.45 The circuit courts had jurisdiction over all matters tri-
able under federal statutes not exclusively reserved to the district
35. Id. at 547, 553.
36. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
37. The Supreme Court itself has stated that the Act "was passed by the First Congress
assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instru-
ment, and is contemporaneous and weightly evidence of its true meaning," Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888). See generally Warren, History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Warren].
38. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 73-75.
39. Id. at §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 73-75.
40. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text infra.
41. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
42. Id.
43. Id. at § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
44. Id.
45. Id. at §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat 73, 76-79.
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courts,46 original jurisdiction in diversity cases4 7 and some appellate
jurisdiction from the district courts.48 In the early days of the system,
admiralty was the major subject area dealt with in the district courts
and diversity of citizenship cases the primary source of business in the
circuit courts.49 The scope of appellate review was limited, and the dis-
trict and circuit courts were often courts of final jurisdiction.50
This limited federal court system was well suited for its time and
remained reasonably efficient well into the 1800's, when the beginning
of a period of massive growth began to take its toll. The changes made
necessary by national expansion eliminated many of the procedural
and substantive provisions of the Act of 1789, but the tri-partite struc-
ture which was established then remains today. However, apart from
the remaining structural similarities, the Act of 1789 is important both
because of the broad responsibilities assumed by Congress in forming
the courts and the way those responsibilities were exercised. There is no
evidence in any of the early congressional deliberations relating to the
Act to show that Congress felt at all strictured in its creation of a judi-
cial system.5' Congress was seemingly exercising powers it deemed
unencumbered by any significant constitutional guidelines, and con-
structed the court system according to its own desires. Specifically,
there is no mention in the constitution of a right of access to the
Supreme Court or even to a circuit court. Neither do there seem to be
any constitutional principles governing the scope of lower court juris-
46. Id. at § I1, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79.
47. Id.
48. Id. at §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85.
49. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 12-13
(1928) [hereinafter cited as F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS]; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at
34-35; Surrency, A History ofFederal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REv. 214, 215-16 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Surrency].
50. HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 18, at 35. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra
note 49, at 13; Warren, supra note 37, at 67-68.
51. One peripheral constitutional debate involved the question of inferior federal courts,
with the Federalists urging the creation of a separate lower federal court system and the more
state-oriented delegates arguing for utilization of the existing state courts for national judicial
purposes. That debate, however, did not raise the question of the congressional power to create
those courts but only the wisdom of doing so. The major constitutional issue involved the extent of
federal jurisdiction. The Federalists argued that the federal judiciary should have full federal
question jurisdiction, giving those courts the greatest possible power under the Constitution. The
anti-Nationalists, in countering that proposal, urged the state court system as an alternative to the
federal courts, necessarily implying little separate federal jurisdiction. The eventual compromise
contained an inferior federal court system with a limited jurisdiction, and it was not until 1875
that the Federalist conception of broad jurisdiction was realized, see note 72 infra. No constitu-
tional objections were raised against the final legislation. See Warren, supra note 37, at 56-58, 62-
64, 66-68.
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diction. 2 The Supreme Court was given its original jurisdiction by the
Constitution, but Congress, acting on its constitutional grant of power
to create inferior courts and to make exceptions and regulations to the
appellate jurisdiction, filled in the contours. 3
Aside from the provision for one Supreme Court, there is essen-
tially nothing "constitutional" about the now familiar structure of the
federal judiciary. Congress at the very beginning assumed a wide range
of responsibility over the judicial branch and acted in a far-reaching
manner to set up a federal court system. Subsequent congresses have
retained this responsibility, acting at various times to increase the size
of the branch by adding new judges or expanding the number of
courts, 54 adjusting judicial business by altering the limits of federal
court jurisdiction,55 or even by governing the actual Supreme Court
term, as was done in 1803 when Congress eliminated an entire
Supreme Court session. 6 Congress thus from a very early day has as-
52. See Warren, supra note 37, at 68. There was some question as to whether Congress
possessed as large a degree of power over lower court jurisdiction as it did over Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction, but this was an issue raised more in historical perspective by Warren than
one much debated in Congress.
53. There had been a general concern that the Constitution as ratified did not adequately
protect the states from the possibility of an unbridled federal judicial system. These feelings ini-
tially resulted in a large number of amendments to both the Judiciary Act and later to the wording
of article III. Similar sentiments about other constitutional provisions and an uneasiness about the
power of the courts resulted ultimately in the passage of the Bill of Rights. In any case, none of the
spokesmen in the debates on the Judiciary Act were overly concerned with protecting the role of
the courts; on the contrary, it was virtually assumed that Congress could act in a broad fashion to
place limitations upon a governmental branch with largely undefined powers. See generally F.
FRANKFURTER & 1. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 11; HART & wECHSLER, wupra note 18, at 12;
Swindler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence to the Constitution, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 503, 520 (1976); Warren, supra note 37, at 53-55, 113-116.
54. See, e.g., Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157 (bringing the total number of
circuit courts to six); Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 2, 2 Stat. 420 (adding a seventh circuit); Act of
July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 2, 14 Stat. 209 (adding an eighth and a ninth circuit), Act of Feb. 9, 1893,
ch. 74, § 1, 27 Stat. 434 (adding a circuit for the District of Columbia); Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch.
363, § 116, 45 Stat. 1346 (establishing a Tenth Circuit and completing the present system of eleven
circuits). See also Act of February 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420 (adding a seventh Supreme
Court Justice) andAct of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44 (creating the office of circuit court
judge).
55. See, e.g., Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 10, 14 Stat. 27, 29 andAct of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (both of which expanded federal court jurisdiction in civil rights cases); Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (expanding Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions); Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656 (providing for writ of error to
the Supreme Court in capital crime cases); Act of Feb. 5, 1825, ch. 6, § 5, 4 Stat. 80, 81; Act of
April 17, 1828, ch. 29, § 7, 4 Stat. 261, 262; Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 9, 9 Stat. 323, 327
(giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over decisions of the highest courts of the Michigan, Ar-
kansas and Oregon territories, respectively).
56. The Judiciary Act had provided two Supreme Court terms per year, and in 1801 Con-
gress changed the schedule to June and December meetings rather than February and August, Act
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sumed a near plenary power over the structure of federal courts, and
there appears to be no evidence of any constitutional objection to such
a legislative prerogative either from the Constitution, the debates sur-
rounding the Act of 1789, or even the federal courts. Congress became
more of an architect than a mechanic, setting up a system to meet con-
temporary needs rather than merely fleshing out a plan already pre-
scribed by the Constitution. As growth of the United States required
changes in the various governmental institutions, Congress clung to its
role of judicial innovator and continually structured the federal court
system to meet current needs.
C. Expansion and Reform
The 19th century marked the beginning of the gradual process of
judicial business wearing down judicial machinery. An examination of
congressional action vis-a-vis the courts reveals a struggle to keep the
federal judiciary in condition to respond effectively to needs of the
times, a struggle in which, on balance, Congress has always seemed to
be at least ten years behind. Frankfurter and Landis, in their definitive
history of the Supreme Court and its workload, noted that Congress
has not always given judicial problems prompt attention, and observed
that "legislation concerning judicial organization throughout our his-
tory has been a very empiric response to very definite needs."57 This
trend is reflected not only in every major change of the 1800's, but of
the 1900's as well. The history of circuit riding is illustrative of the
problems surrounding judicial reform. The 1789 Judiciary Act pro-
vided for circuit riding by the Supreme Court Justices, who combined
with district court judges to hold the circuit court sessions.58 These ses-
of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 1, 2 Stat. 89. The repealer to that legislation, Act of March 8, 1802,
ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, did not change that schedule, but a bill following, Act of April 29, 1802, ch.
31, § 1, 2 Stat. 156, established one term per year to commence in February. Since the Court had
met last in December 1801, and the 1802 statute called for February terms, eliminating what
would have otherwise been an upcoming June term, the next meeting of the Supreme Court took
place in February of 1803, a gap of fourteen months. The purpose of the legislation was to put off
decision on the case of Marbury v. Madison, 51 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally 1 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222-30 (1926) [hereinafter cited as I
C. WARREN]; L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 76-79 (1965).
57. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 13.
58. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74, See generall, P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 7-9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FISH]; F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 14-16, 18-20, 22, 25; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 37-38; 1 C.
WARREN, supra note 56, at 58-62; Surrency, supra note 49, at 221-23. The original circuit courts
did not have their own bench because the courts were staffed by a combination of Supreme Court
Justices and district court judges. This is to be contrasted with the modem circuit system estab-
lished in 1891, see notes 84-95 and accompanying text infra, that provided for an entirely separate
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sions were always held in the various cities of each circuit, and the
system's intended benefits included bringing the federal judiciary out
to the populace and ingraining in the Justices an appreciation of local
law.5 9 However, the concurrent growth of territory and population
combined with contemporary travel conditions to make circuit riding
not only a tremendously taxing physical burden but also an impedi-
ment to an effective discharge of justice in either forum.60 This strain
was felt as early as the 1790's, and Congress passed a form of relief in
the Act of March 2, 179361 which allowed for a rotation system that
required only one circuit trip per justice per year. However, due to the
increased business at all levels of the federal courts and the spiraling
Supreme Court workload, it became apparent that the practice of cir-
cuit riding would have to come to an end. Congress, however, estab-
lishing an unfortunate pattern, waited eight years before acting to
reform the system with the Second Judiciary Act of 1801.62 Unfortu-
nately, that Act was notorious for some of its other provisions, namely
the appointment of "midnight judges '63 that culminated in the case of
Marbury v. Madison,' and it was repealed after the election of Thomas
Jefferson as president in 1802.65 The Jeffersonians could not ignore the
bench and a very distinct jurisdiction. The old circuit system, abandoned for all practical purposes
many years earlier, was not actually abolished until 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36
Stat. 1087, 1167.
59. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 16-21; 1 C. WARREN, supra note
56, at 58; Surrency, supra note 49, at 229-30.
60. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 21-22; 1 C. WARREN,
supra note 56, at 86-88; Surrency, supra note 49, at 221-23. Chief Justice John Jay had written
President Washington regarding the burdens of the practice as early as 1792, F. FRANKFURTER
AND J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 22, and by the 1830's the average distance traveled by a Supreme
Court Justice had risen to 2000 miles, with Justice McKinley logging 10.000 miles in one year
alone. Surrency, supra note 49, at 221.
61. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333.
62. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 1, 2 Stat. 89.
63. The term "midnight judges" arose from the Act's controversial judicial appointments,
which, being made on the eve of Thomas Jefferson's inauguration, were designed to deprive him
of important judicial selections. Other than that controversial provision, the Act contained for-
ward-looking sections regarding circuit riding and circuit organization. See F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 25, 29=30; Surrency, supra note 49, at 219-21.
64. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. There was some debate in Congress over the
constitutionality of repealing legislation which had already established judgeships and structured
the judiciary. The resolution of the dispute over the "midnight judge" legislation was based more
on politics than legal theory (only one Jeffersonian votedagainst repeal), see F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 26, n.75, but the debate touched on some interesting constitutional
aspects of congressional power in regard to the federal judiciary. Federalist leaders equated repeal
with putting the Constitution and courts at the mercy of the legislature, id. at 27, but the Senate
floor leader denied that Congress even had a duty to create inferior courts, and reasoned that if
Congress was free to abolish a court it could abolish the new judgeships of the 1801 Act, id. at 26.
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circuit riding problem, though, and later in 1802 they passed an act to
restrict but not eliminate the practice.66 Circuit riding was eliminated
for all practical purposes in 1869,67 but not officially terminated until
1891,68 nearly one hundred years after if first became a serious prob-
lem-a practical illustration of the slow congressional response to judi-
cial needs.
Apart from the circuit riding dispute, population growth and ex-
pansion of federal regulation and litigation also resulted in increasing
business for the federal courts.69 Despite an increase in the number of
circuits and justices, the judicial system was unable to keep abreast of
its new business. 0 The escalating workload intensified after the Civil
War, when the triumph of national authority and the disputes arising
from Reconstruction further taxed the existing system by adding new
types of disputes to be litigated in federal courts. 1 In 1875, Congress
further compounded the situation by tremendously expanding federal
court jurisdiction. 2
The federal courts from 1789 through the Reconstruction period
had become essentially "subsidiary courts" limited to diversity jurisdic-
tion cases.7 3 The Act of March 3, 1875,14 reflecting a tremendous ex-
The issue was never addressed by the Supreme Court, and Congress was again left in a position of
strong authority over the judiciary.
66. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156, as amended by Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2
Stat. 244.
67. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, 45.
68. The Circuit Court of Appeals Act, Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, by estab-
lishing the new circuit courts of appeals, arguably ended circuit riding because of its relegation of
the old circuit system to obscurity and its establishment of the separate circuit bench, and Sur-
rency, supra note 55, at 234, claims that the practice was abolished more by custom than by
statute. But see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 41 (arguing that circuit riding ended with
the statutory demise of circuit courts in 1911).
69. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 43-51. Out of 173 cases on the
Supreme Court docket in 1845, 109 were left undecided at the end of the term that year, id. at 51.
70. See Id. at 60, 69; see notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
71. This swelling of the dockets was due to the growth of the country's business, the
assumption of authority over cases heretofore left to state courts, and the extension of the
field of federal activity. The great commercial development brings its share of litigation
to the courts; booms and panic alike furnish grist for the courts .... invention occa-
sions many and complicated patent controversies .... These are items that add greatly
to the work of the courts without any enlargement of their jurisdiction.
Id. at 60-61.
72. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Seegenerally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
supra note 49, at 65; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 39; Surrency, supra note 49, at 233.
The Act essentially gave the lower federal courts jurisdiction over all suits, subject to a jurisdic-
tional limit of $500, arising under the Constitution. The Supreme Court was given appellate juris-
diction subject to writ of error or appeal.
73. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 64; Surrency, supra note 49, at 216.
74. See note 72 supra.
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pansion of national power, forever changed the scope of those courts.
As Frankfurter and Landis pointed out, the new Act meant that:
[t]hese courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between
citizens of different states and became the primary and powerful reli-
ances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws,
and treaties of the United States. Thereafter, any suit asserting such a
right could be begun in the federal courts; any such action begun in a
state court could be removed to the federal courts for disposition.75
By passage of this legislation, Congress added a whole new dimension
to what had already been an increasing workload.
The beginning of the 1850 Supreme Court term saw 253 cases on
the Court's docket.76 This increased to 310 by 1860, 636 in 1870, 1212
in 1880 and 1,816 in 1890. 7 These increases were only the reflection of
an even larger workload in the lower federal courts, where business
swelled from 29,013 cases in 1873 to 38,045 in 1880 and finally to
44,194 in 1890."8 As judges at all levels struggled to keep abreast of
their duties, the old circuit system fell into total disrepair. Supreme
Court Justices were often unable to perform their circuit duties and, as
a result, district court judges, acting alone, were forced to perform
nearly 90% of all circuit court business. 79 Since the circuit courts pos-
sessed a limited appellate jurisdiction, these single judge courts often
heard appeals from cases in which the circuit judge had originally pre-
sided as a district judge."0 Not only were the overworked circuits hear-
ing their own appeals, but they were also in many instances courts of
final jurisdiction. At that time, all cases intitiated in the circuit courts
involving less than $5,000 were not subject to appeal.5t This put a very
heavy burden on a group of courts staffed only by part-time jurists.
75. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 65.
76. Id. at 60. More detailed statistics regarding caseload are available in the REP. ATTY.
GEN. for any of the years in question.
77. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 60.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 87.
80. See id. at 87-88. In 1887, under the modified original circuit court system, permanent
circuit judges were supposed to hold circuit court sessions in conjunction with a Supreme Court
Justice and district court judge assigned to the court. The problem with the system was that
Supreme Court Justices had such a large volume of business in Washington that they were unable
to perform their circuit duties, and that the circuit judges, numbering only ten, were unable to
spread themselves over the 65 circuit courts. As a result, district court judges often held circuit
court sessions on their own, presenting problems when the circuit court exercised appellate juris-
diction over the district courts.
81. See id. at 88. The practical effect of this jurisdictional limit was that cases initiated in
circuit court involving less than $5,000 were not subject to appeal-a fact which, when combined
with the problem of circuit courts often being staffed by district court judges only, did not always
lead to the best results.
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Congress did not ignore the need for reform, but major policy dis-
agreements existed over whether relief should be accomplished by in-
creasing the number of courts and judges or by drastically reducing
federal court jurisdiction.82 These debates began in 1875, and although
a new tier of federal courts in the form of separate and independent
circuit courts was proposed as early as 1848,83 no changes were made
until 1891. By that time every level of the system was operating at such
an inefficient pace that the years from 1870 to 1890 have been generally
regarded as the judiciary's worst period.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act, also known as the Evarts Act,
was signed into law on March 3, 1891.84 It structurally modified the
system for the first time since 1789. The Act established nine Circuit
Courts of Appeals,8" eliminated all Supreme Court circuit riding re-
sponsibilities,86 and created new judgeships to fill the new circuit judge
positions.87 Most importantly, the Act provided immediate relief to the
Supreme Court docket by eliminating appeal by right in nearly all
cases.88 This was accomplished by preserving a direct line of appeal in
cases deemed more intrinsically important and making all other deci-
sions appealable from the district courts to the new circuit courts for
final disposition. The Evarts Act also greatly broadened the Supreme
Court scope of review in criminal cases;8 9 this was an especially novel
element since for well over one hundred years no criminal appeals were
heard in the Supreme Court.90
82. The situation was exacerbated by a deep split between the House and Senate regarding
litigation involving corporations outside of their state of incorporation. The ability of these corpo-
rations to remove to federal court was clogging circuit court dockets. Three times the House voted
to restrict that source of access and three times the Senate voted it down. Id. at 89-91.
83. Id. at 70. Senator Douglas also proposed such a court in 1854 as a part of a plan of
judicial reorganization. Id.
84. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
85. Id. §§ 1, 3, 26 Stat. 826, 827.
86. Id. § 2, 3.
87. Id. § 1, 26 Stat. 826.
88. Id. § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828.
89. Id. § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28.
90. The only avenue of federal criminal appeal available before the Evarts Act was a 1889
provision allowing writs of error in capital cases, see note 55 supra. The aforementioned problems
regarding understaffed circuit courts also made their presence felt in the criminal area, especially
with the unwelcome prospect of a single judge rendering life and death decisions without opportu-
nity for review. Despite the fact that Congress had granted some appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases, feeling against the old system ran high in Congress during the enactment of the Evarts Act,
and the legislation eventually provided that the Supreme Court have power of review over all
appeals from "infamous" crimes. Apparently, however, none of the drafters had been aware of the
Supreme Court's broad construction of what constituted an "infamous" crime. See, e.g., Parkin-
son v. United States, 121 U.S. 281 (1887); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886); United
States v. Petit, 114 U.S. 429 (1885); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). The subsequent codifi-
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Apart from the creation of three independent tiers of federal
courts, the most important contribution of the Circuit Act was its provi-
sion for discretionary review.91 Although appeals from the district
courts were intended to be taken to the circuit courts for final decision,
Congress did allow for some further review of the circuit courts by ei-
ther certification or certiorari to the Supreme Court. Certification was a
discretionary process by which a circuit court could refer a difficult or
important case to the Supreme Court for review; essentially the lower
courts sought clarification of the law or wished to speed the appellate
process. 92 The certiorari mechanism was unique in that it allowed liti-
gants who had lost at a lower level to petition the Supreme Court to
review their case.93 Since the cases from which certiorari was to be
available were considered comparatively less important than those
from which direct appeal could be taken,94 the device more likely was
meant to be a way of correcting erroneous circuit court decisions, not a
method for controlling the docket or a tool by which the Court would
selectively pick cases to form the national law. However, the rationale
for the creation of the writ of certiorari was never developed in the
congressional debates.95
cation of the phrase opened the gates of appeal in criminal cases far Aider than had been in-
tended. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 109-113; see also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 34; Warren supra note 37, at 51, 73.
91. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6,26 Stat. 826. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18,
at 40-41.
92. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 41.
93. See id. Whereas the Supreme Court previously reviewed cases which either came before
it on direct appeal or were certified by the lower federal courts, litigants could now, utilizing the
writ of certiorari, initiate their own petition for review of cases that otherwise would be final in the
circuit courts of appeals.
94. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 99. This provision for sending the
more important cases to the Supreme Court and the less difficult to the circuit courts originated in
an American Bar Association Committee which had been working in conjunction with Congress
on the legislation. See Report ofthe Committee on JudicialAdministration andRemedial Procedure,
17 A.B.A. REP. 336, 337 (1891). This purpose is also reflected in the statute that provided that all
constitutional questions, decisions of state supreme courts presenting a federal question, and capi-
tal and infamous crimes be preserved for direct Supreme Court review. Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
517, §§ 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827.
95. See 21 CONG. REc. 10286 (1890). The writ was simply intended to be a procedural
mechanism by which the Supreme Court selected cases for review from the final decisions of the
circuit courts of appeals. Since 1891, of course, the writ has taken on much greater importance,
since the Supreme Court Justices now use it to shape the majority of their docket. The category of
cases available for review under the writ has been greatly expanded, and the members of the High
Court can use it to review selected cases of national importance and deny review in instances
where circumstances are not appropriate for final decision or where a case is insufficient on the
merits. See Blumstein, supra note 12, at 905-07; Brennan I, supra note 7, at 476-79; Goldberg,
supra note 7, at 14-15; Warren I, supra note 7, at 677-78.
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The Circuit Act provided immediate relief to the Supreme Court,
with new filings going from 623 in 1890 to 379 in 1891, when the Act
was only in operation for a few months, to 275 in 1892.96 The troubles
of the 1870's-1890's had been dispelled by a system that was able to
efficiently keep abreast of its business in a fashion not evident since the
very early days of the century. As welcome and necessary as these re-
forms were, though, the passage of time, along with the continued
growth of national legislation, regulation and population combined to
eventually erode the relief afforded by the Circuit Act. Some classes of
cases remained on the obligatory docket, and it was an increase in their
number that again caused the docket to grow past manageable limits.
This trend is illustrated by the growth of both bankruptcy litigation and
cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Prior to
World War I, both types of cases were reserved to the obligatiory por-
tion of the docket; the first by express proviso in later legislation97 and
the second implicitly by the provision requiring review of "federal
questions."9" At the time of the Circuit Act, neither area was particu-
larly important since the FELA had yet to be enacted and the bank-
ruptcy laws had not been deemed to need direct Supreme.Court review.
The main problem with the bankruptcy cases involved the role of the
Supreme Court in developing the law. The subject had been so thor-
oughly litigated and articulated that the Court was put in the position
of making little more than factual review,99 a function capable of being
carried out by the circuit courts but that the Supreme Court retained
due to the obligatory review provisions of various legislative acts. Con-
gress remedied the situation by passing legislation in 1915 which cut off
Supreme Court review as of right in all bankruptcy cases. 100 Congress
also used the occasion to withdraw from direct review all cases arising
under the trademark laws and cases coming from the district court of
Puerto Rico.10
The problem with the Federal Employers Liability Act 0 2 was the
theory propounded very early by the Supreme Court in the The Em-
ployers' Liability Cases°3 that compensation be allowed only for those
96. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 102.
97. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 252, 36 Stat. 1159.
98. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826.
99. See H.R. REP. No. 1182, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), refprintedin 52 CONG. REc. 435
(1914). See also F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 203-04.
100. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 4, 38 Stat. 803.
101. Id. at § 2.
102. Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65.
103. 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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injuries suffered while employees were working in interstate com-
merce."° The complex factual situations of many different cases aris-
ing under the FELA produced a surfeit of contradictory opinions that
only spawned more appeals and more litigation. 5 As Frankfurter and
Landis pointed out: "[A] reading of the opinions constrains one to be-
lieve that these. . . cases constitute the most copious and futile waste
of the Supreme Court's efforts."' 6 Yet, under obligatory federal ques-
tion review, the Court continued to review the cases and render deci-
sions. Congress remedied the situation in 1916 by relegating the
litigation to the circuit courts for final decision,0 7 but only after the
Supreme Court had struggled with the problem for more than two
years. Thus, by removing bankruptcy and FELA cases from the obliga-
tory Supreme Court docket, the caseload of the Court was at least tem-
porarily relieved.
While Congress was able to remedy these two specific difficulties,
neither piece of ameliorative legislation provided a great deal of long
lasting relief.' 8 World War I and the years following brought an ex-
pansion of regulatory activities, a wider range of trade and disputes
over war contracts which all combined to once again clog the route of
direct appeals.0 9 On this occasion, reform was faster in coming be-
cause of the leadership of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, who,
along with several of his colleagues on the Court, specified the most
appropriate and desired form of relief.I" The result of their efforts was
the Judges' Bill of 1925,"' which also became known as the Cert Act
because of its broadening of the use of the writ of certiorari. The pur-
pose of the Act was to relieve the burden stemming from the obligatory
104. Id. at 497-99.
105. See, e.g., Norfolk So. R.R. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269 (1915); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Padgett, 236 U.S. 668 (1915); Wabash R.R. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86 (1914); Exparte Roe, 234 U.S.
70 (1914); North Carolina R.R. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248 (1914); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moore,
228 U.S. 433 (1913); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). For a more compre-
hensive list of these cases see F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 207-09, n-101.
106. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 207-08.
107. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 4, 39 Stat. 726.
108. SeeF. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supranote 49, at 205, 216.
109. See id. at 105-08, 230. Much pre-war legislation, such as the Food and Drug Act (Act of
June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768), the Federal Employers Liability Act (Act of April 22, 1908,
ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65) and the Anti-Narcotic Act (Act of Feb. 9, 1909, ch. 100, 35 Stat. 614, as
amended by Act of Jan. 17, 1914, ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275) combined with active agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Reserve Board to increase judicial business.
After the war, the cancellation of contracts and criminal offenses under the prohibition laws also
flooded the courts. See 62 CONG. REc. 2584-86 (1921).
110. See generally P. FISH, supra note 58, at 79-90; F. FRANKFUTER & J. LANDIS, supra note
49, at 59-60.
111. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936.
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docket by relegating nearly all classes of cases to the circuit courts of
appeals.' 2 The Supreme Court would then exercise its discretionary
review by screening any resultant writs of certiorari.' 13 This legislation
relieved the Supreme Court workload by allowing the Justices to con-
trol the size of the docket. The Cert Act also greatly increased the
number of decisions to be made in the circuit courts of appeals.' 14
From this point on, the writ of certiorari became an important facet of
Supreme Court business and procedure.
Today, the federal judicial system exists in the form established by
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and modified by the Circuit Act and the
Judges' Bill. The number of Supreme Court justices was eventually
fixed at nine. " The number of circuits has been increased to eleven,"
6
and many more circuit and district judgeships have been added.' 7 The
only major structural deviation from the 1789 system was the Circuit
Act's formation of new circuit courts.
Reform of the federal courts has thus assumed a constant pattern
in which new provisions are outstripped by the needs and demands of a
changing society. The advent of reform is often a long process that re-
quires outdated judicial structures and procedures to function in the
face of an ever-accumulating workload. As demonstrated by the at-
tempts to abolish circuit riding and to create the modern circuit court
system, Congress has been slow in enacting judicial reform. Judicial
problems often reach their worst possible stage before meriting any
congressional attention.
Two important points stand out when reviewing this period of
growth and expansion of the federal courts. First, many jurisdictional
concepts are merely aspects of judicial procedure which were not, as is
often assumed, part and parcel of the original statutory or even consti-
tutional organization. The writ of certiorari, for example, appeared in
112. Id., which amended the Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 128-29, 237-40, 36 Stat. 1087-
89, to make most categories of decisions final in the circuit courts of appeals. The class of cases
preserved for direct Supreme Court review included suits under the antitrust and interstate com-
merce law, suits to enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, suits to enjoin enforce-
ment of state statutes or action by state administrative officers, and writs of error by the United
States in criminal cases. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, amending Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 238, 36 Stat. 1087, 1089. Older provisions, such as those giving the Supreme Court
direct review of state supreme court decisions involving a federal question, were not affected.
113. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 231, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, amending Act of March 3, 1911, Pub. L.
No. 475, §§ 237-38, 36 Stat. 1087, 1089.
114. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 262-63.
115. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44.
116. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 41, 62 Stat. 870.
117. See, e.g., Act of March 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-372, § 1, 2, 80 Stat. 75.
Spring 1978]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
1891 and only acquired its present status as a central tool of discretion-
ary review in the last fifty years. In addition, broad subject matter juris-
diction was not always a characteristic of the federal courts. Full
federal question jurisdiction was not conferred until 1875, and no fed-
eral criminal cases were heard by the Supreme Court before 1891.118 It
should be remembered that the federal courts were designed as courts
of very limited jurisdiction, and that many questions of law were to be
decided by state tribunals. Even when a case reached the old circuit
courts, a decision was often final because of the jurisdictional $5000
limit. At one time it was even possible for single federal district judges
to nullify an act of Congress.1 9 The broad, all encompassing federal
judiciary of the 1960's and 1970's is therefore a creature of rather recent
birth whose character was never fully anticipated by the designers of
the original plans.
The second and more important aspect of the historical analysis is
the broad architectural role played by Congress in implementing the
various reforms. Without questioning the scope of its own powers or
being questioned by the courts, Congress has created and eliminated
judges and courts, curtailed and expanded the limits of federal jurisdic-
tion, and essentially assumed full and total control over the whole fed-
eral court system. Apart from any abstract discussion of constitutional
limitations, there is no evidence that Congress ever felt constrained by
the Constitution to adhere to any specific standards, and there is little
evidence suggesting that observors or critics ever tried to hold it to
such. While the exact boundaries of congressional power in this area
are discussed in a later section, Congress seems to have continually re-
garded its powers in this area as plenary.
These considerations should be kept in mind when viewing the
current status of the judiciary. Recent caseload controversies may well
be the beginning of another chapter in the saga of appellate court re-
form, and the creation of new mechanisms, an abandonment of seem-
ingly well-entrenched principles and what might appear to be a
118. See note 97 supra.
119. In United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. IM. 1906) a federal district judge
blocked an important antitrust prosecution by quashing the indictment. Under the current statu-
tory scheme, the government had no right of appeal, and the case against Armour was dismissed.
The uproar over this result eventually led to statutory reform. Yet, as Frankfurter and Landis
point out, the reform was implemented only because of the notoriety of that particular case. The
scheme of review had long been a part of the judicial system and "had been urged [for repeal] by
Attorneys General for fifteen years without evoking a ripple in Congress. "F. FRANKFURTER
& J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 114-18.
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startling congressional exercise of power must be recognized as time-
tried elements of a well-traveled road to institutional change.
D. The Appellate Explosion
The growth of industrial America combined with the expansion of
federal regulation and national commerce have worked throughout his-
tory to overload the federal courts. Congress debates changes and even-
tually remedies the situation, and then awaits the inevitable
reoccurence of the problems. The last two instances of this phenome-
non, before the Circuit Act of 1891 and the Cert Act of 1925, were both
in the form of an overload of the Supreme Court obligatory docket, but
the most recent problem is simply a sheer avalanche of petitions for
discretionary review and a troublesome increase in the number of cases
arising on direct appeal.' 20 From 1952 to 1971, thenumber of cases on
the Supreme Court docket increased from 1,429 to 4,515. In 1952, the
newly filed cases numbered 1,283; by 1971 they had increased to 3,643.
The total number of cases peaked at over 5,000 and has hovered
around that number ever since.
121
The lower federal courts have experienced an equal, if not greater,
upswing. From 1968 to 1975, filings in the federal district courts in-
creased from 102,163 to 148,298. Filings in the federal courts of ap-
peals, which had more than doubled from 1961 to 1968, increased from
9,116 to 16,658 during the period from 1968 to 1975.122 In terms of
percentages, the district court filings have increased 26% since 1970,
with courts of appeals filings up 43% for the same period. The exact
character of these increases is a matter of great dispute. 123 Some com-
mentators have claimed that while the actual number of cases on the
Supreme Court docket has increased, the substantive workload of the
Court remains the same, the increase being due largely to frivolous ap-
peals. 124 Other commentators see the problem as one which only af-
flicts the lower federal courts. 125 Two groups deem the problem serious
enough to merit abolition of all routes of direct appeal to the Supreme
120. FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-9.
121. Id. at A-2. See also The Supreme Court-1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 278-79
(1976); The Supreme Court-1975 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 297-98 (1977).
122. 1975 MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNrrE STATES COURTs 126 (1976).
123. See Brennan I, supra note 7, at 473-78; Gressman 1, supra note 7, at 952-54; Warren &
Burger, supra note 7, at 722. But see A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 4-6; Freund, supra note 7, at
139-141.
124. "Contrary to the Study Group's assumption, the Supreme Court is not overworked."
Brennan I, supra note 7, at 475-76.
125. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 175-76 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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Court, the division of existing circuit courts of appeals into smaller en-
tities or the creation of new circuits, vast curtailment of federal juris-
diction, or even the creation of a National Court of Appeals.
126
Concern about the effects of Supreme Court overwork commonly
follow two general lines. First the Supreme Court is seen to be so over-
taxed by the mere volume of petitions for review that the screening
process occupies too much of the Justices' time, leaving them little op-
portunity to properly perform their other functions.'27 Second, there is
a related concern regarding appellate capacity, referring to the ability
of the Supreme Court to make sufficient decisions to maintain stability
and coherency in the national law.' 28 It has been argued that while
much of the Court's increased workload is non-substantive, a certain
constant percentage of filings should be reviewed, especially those rep-
resenting conflicts among the lower courts. While that percentage rises
along with the total number of cases, the Supreme Court continues to
review only a relatively fixed number of cases and write a relatively
fixed number of opinions.'29 The effect of this is said to be a general
increase in the number of important decisions that are not made, ad-
ding an ever increasing amount of uncertainty to the national law.
130
Controversy is nothing new to the federal judicial system. Societal
trends directly affect the courts, and are accompanied by heated de-
bates over what, if anything, to do about the current problems. The
actual substance of the supposed "caseload crisis" is a subject best left
to other forums, but it is obviously a matter causing great concern. The
creation of both the Freund Study Group and the Hruska Commission
are outgrowths of such concern; both groups have proposed a National
Court of Appeals as one solution to the problem. Lack of immediate
affection for such proposals is also nothing new, but as the history of
judicial reform indicates, contemporary opinions about the judicial
structure and function must often be reevaluated before lasting change
can be effectuated. This was true with both circuit riding and direct
routes to Supreme Court review; it may well be true again.
126. See FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-36; HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-10.
127. See FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-9.
128. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-3.
129. See Griswold, supra note 6, at 339-41. "[A]bout eighteen percent of paid cases (appeals
and certiorari) were heard on the merits twenty years ago, while about six percent of paid cases
were heard on the merits during the 1973 Term. What became of the other twelve percent of paid
cases?... [They were lost in the 1973 Term simply because of inadequate appellate capacity to
hear cases on a national basis." Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
130. Id.; see also HRUsKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-8, 76-90.
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In viewing the current proposals for a National Court of Appeals,
it is well to remember that at the outset the Constitution provided only
broad contours for the federal judiciary and gave Congress the author-
ity and discretion to design a federal court system under article III pro-
visions. Furthermore, history shows that aside from the three-tiered
hierarchy of district, circuit and Supreme courts, other judicial matters,
such as jurisdiction and power of review, have been subject to consider-
able change and redesign, consistent with what appears to be the con-
stitutional scope of congressional power.
II. The National Court Of Appeals
A. The Freund Report
Congress created the Federal Judicial Center in 1968 to "research
and study . . . the operation of the courts of the United States."'
' 3 1
Chief Justice Burger, in his capacity as chairman of the Center, estab-
lished the Freund Study Group to "study the caseload of the Supreme
Court and to make such recommendations as its findings war-
ranted." '32 The Study Group was comprised of non-jurists who had all
had extensive experience with the workings of the Supreme Court. 33
The Study Group filed their final report, the Freund Report, in De-
cember, 1972.
The Study Group concluded that the exponential caseload rise
would continue and that "the conditions essential for the.performance
of the Court's mission do not exist."' 34 After rejecting such remedies as
additional law clerks, 135 restricting the Supreme Court to a constitu-
131. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 620, 81 Stat. 664.
132. FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at ix.
133. The members of the Study Group and their affiliation at the time the Report was com-
piled were Paul A. Freund (Harvard Law School), Alexander M. Bickel (Yale Law School), Peter
D. Ehrenhaft (a Washington, D.C. attorney), Russell D. Niles (Director of the Institute of Judicial
Administration, former Dean of New York University Law School), Bernard G. Segal (former
president of both the American Bar Association and American College of Trial Lawyers), Robert
L. Stem (a Chicago attorney, co-author with Eugene Gressman of SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
(3rd ed. 1962)), and Charles Alan Wright (University of Texas School of Law).
134. FREUND REPORT, supra note I, at 5. But see Casper & Posner, .4 Study ofthe Supreme
Court's Caseload, III JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 339 (1974). Those authors use several factors
to show that exponential caseload rise is not a certainty, and that the number of certiorari filings
depends on "(1) the number and scope of new federal rights, (2) the procedural devices that facili-
tate or obstruct the enforcement of federal rights, (3) the costs to litigants of asserting such rights
at various stages of the litigation process, and (4) the certainty or definiteness of the rights." Id. at
360.
135. FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16.
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tional court136 or dividing the Supreme Court into panels,137 the Study
Group made four major recommendations. The first was to eliminate
three judge district courts and to make all cases now appealable as of
right appealable only by writ of certiorari, thereby giving the Supreme
Court total control over its docket. 38 The second proposal was the es-
tablishment of a non-judicial agency to process prisoner appeals,139 and
the third suggestion was increased staff support for the Supreme Court
Clerk's office and improved secretarial and library facilities.1
4°
The final and central proposal was the recommendation of a Na-
tional Court of Appeals (NCA).14 1 The main function of the NCA
would be to screen all petitions for certiorari and appeals and certify to
the Supreme Court those most appropriate for Supreme Court review.
The NCA would also decide conflicts among the lower federal courts
that do not merit Supreme Court review. The entire NCA screening
process, including denying certiorari petitions and deciding which cases
to retain for review, would be governed by Supreme Court policy
guidelines set down by the Supreme Court rulemaking power or other
appropriate mechanism. 142 All of these decisions, as well as denials of
certiorari, would be final. Once a case was certified, the Supreme Court
could dispose of it by decision, denial of review, or reference back to
the National Court of Appeals for a final binding decision. The result
of such a reform would be to relieve the Supreme Court of the task of
screening certiorari petitions. While this change would effect a substan-
tial time savings, the Supreme Court would be deprived of the ability
completely to pick and choose those cases it wished to review. 1
43
The Freund Report's call for a National Court of Appeals aroused
a storm of protest, most notably from members of the Supreme Court
and judges of the lower courts.1 44 The attacks covered many areas,
ranging from contentions by former Court members Warren and
Goldberg that such a plan would violate the constitutional edict of
"one supreme Court" because of the NCA's ability to make final deci-
136. Id. at 10.
137. Id. at 7-8.
138. Id. at 26-27.
139. Id. at 47-48.
140. Id. at 43-45.
141. Id. at 18-24.
142. Id. at 22-23.
143. The Supreme Court would retain the power to grant certiorari before judgment in a
court of appeals, before judgment in the National Court of Appeals, or before denial of review by
the NCA. The Study Group urged that this power be used only in exceptional circumstances. Id.
at 21.
144. See note 7 supra.
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sions,145 to claims that eliminating the Supreme Court screening func-
tion would entail a loss of control over national priorities in
constitutional and legal matters.146 It was argued that cases such as
Brown v. Board of Education47 and Baker v. Carr48 would never have
been certified by an NCA because they were so completely controlled
by precedent.' 49 There was also a fundamental disagreement led by
former Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan with
the Freund Report's assessment of the Court's workload.' 50 They ar-
gued, in Douglas' words, that "[t]he case for our 'overwork' is a
myth."'
15 1
The amount and degree of opposition doomed the proposals of the
Freund Study Group to getting no further than the pages of its final
report. Apart from the propriety of its provisions, the Study Group's
ideas do provide an interesting insight into the functions which a Na-
tional Court of Appeals might perform. It also provides, along with its
criticisms, a practical view of the constitutional aspects of judicial re-
form.
B. The Hruska Commission
Congress created the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System on October 13, 1972.152 The Commission was
composed of seventeen members; four each were appointed by the
House, Senate, President and Chief Justice, with the original sixteen
selecting an executive director.' 53 Senator Roman L. Hruska was ap-
pointed chairman. The Commission's work was divided into two
phases; the first dealt with geographical boundaries of the federal judi-
145. Black, supra note 7, at 885; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 14; Warren I, supra note 7, at
677-78.
146. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 480-84.
147. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
148. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
149. Black, supra note 7, at 888-90; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 14-15; see also Warren &
Burger, supra note 7, at 729.
150. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-75 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Brennan , supra note 7, at 475-76; Warren & Burger, supra note 7, at 722.
151. 409 U.S. at 174 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
152. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, § 1, 86 Stat. 807.
153. Commission members at the time of the filing of the Final Report were: Senators Quen-
tin N. Burdick, Hiram L. Fong, Roman L. Hruska and John L. McClellan; Congressmen Jack
Brooks, Walter Flowers, Edward Hutchinson and Charles E. Wiggins; Emanuel Celler, Roger C.
Cramton, Francis R. Kirkham and Judge Alfred T. Sulmonetti (appointed by President Ford);
and Judge J. Edward Lumbard, Judge Roger Robb, Bernard G. Segal and Herbert Wechsler (all
appointed by the Chief Justice). These members selected A. Leo Levin (the present director of the
Federal Judicial Center) as their executive director.
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cial circuits, the second with structure and procedures of the federal
courts. Congress did limit the scope of the Commission's work by spe-
cifically excluding any considerations of federal court jurisdiction.
15 4
The Commission's final report (Hruska Report) on the second phase of
their work was issued in June, 1975, and called for a new version of a
National Court of Appeals.1 5
The Commission's primary concern was the lack of an adequate
national appellate capacity. 156 An examination of the Supreme Court
caseload showed that while the district courts and the circuit courts of
appeals annually issue an ever increasing number of decisions, the
Supreme Court, despite an explosion in the number of petitions for
certiorari, continues to make the same number of decisions on the mer-
its each year.1 57 As a result, where the Supreme Court once reviewed
20% of all courts of appeals decisions, it now reviews only 1%.158 The
Commission concluded that many cases that were proper for review
and that would have been reviewed in past years were now being de-
nied certiorari because of a lack of Supreme Court capacity. The out-
growth of this lessened supervision was said to be an erosion of the
consistency of national law, with circuits continually more likely to be
in opposition with each other and less likely to have their decisions
reviewed. This situation was viewed as promoting both uncertainty and
forum shopping by litigants in search of a favorable decision.159
154. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
155. Id. at 5-10.
156. Id. at 1-4, 5-10, 13-16, 76-90.
157. See Griswold, supra note 6, at 339-41. See also note 141 supra.
158. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
159. The Commission cited studies on unresolved conflicts among the lower federal courts
and on the increase in the number of dissents from the denial of certiorari. In "Conflicts Involving
Federal Law: A Review of Cases Presented to the Supreme Court" (reprinted in HRUSKA REPORT,
supra note I, at 93-111), Floyd Feeney studied the denied petitions for certiorari for the 1971 and
1972 terms of the Supreme Court (without considering any in forma pauperis motions). Feeney
concluded that the existence of conflicts among the circuits not reviewed by the Supreme Court
was greatly increasing, with a projected average of approximately sixty-five per year. Id. at 108-
09. The Commission selected six cases from the study as primary examples of the inadequate
appellate capacity: Cirillo v. United States, 410 U.S. 989 (1973) (admissibility of hearsay evidence
in a criminal conspiracy trial); Kocher v. United States, 411 U.S. 931 (1973) (tax); American Air-
lines v. Locaynia, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (vacation pay as a veteran's property right under the Uni-
versal Training and Service Act); Castell v. United States, 406 U.S. 918 (1972) (required
provisions in a federal indictment for possession of stolen goods in interstate commerce); Fields v.
Schuyler, 411 U.S. 987 (1972) (patents); Milstein v. GAF Corp., 496 U.S. 910 (1972) (Securities
Exchange Act interpretation). Id at 109-11. But see Owens, supra note S, at 596. In surveying the
number and quality of dissents from the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Commis-
sion perceived a general inference that the Court was unable to decide every case worthy of re-
view. Id. at 116. But see Owens, supra note 8, at 597-98. The Commission made a detailed
statistical study of the number of these dissents and also relied on the various reasons given in the
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The Commission's major remedy was the creation of a National
Court of Appeals, a tribunal aimed more at increasing the number of
nationally binding decisions than relieving the burden on any particu-
lar court. The NCA would receive cases by two methods, transfer juris-
diction 60 and reference jurisdiction.
161
Under transfer jurisdiction, pending cases would be sent up from
the circuit courts of appeals, the Court of Claims or the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals. Cases would be transferred if an immediate
decision by the NCA would be in the public interest or if a case fell
within one of the three following categories: 1) if the case turns on a
rule of federal law and federal courts have reached inconsistent conclu-
sions with respect to it; 2) the case turns on a rule of federal law "appli-
cable to a recurring factual situation," and it is determined that a
prompt NCA decision would outweigh any disadvantages of a transfer;
or 3) the case turns on a rule of federal law previously announced by
the NCA and substantial questions regarding the interpretation or ap-
plication of that rule are present in the case. 162 Transfer motions would
not be motions of appeal, and could be initiated by either a party to a
case or the lower court itself.16 The NCA would also be empowered to
decline to accept the transfer of any case,"6 and any transfer decision
on the merits would be subject to Supreme Court review by certio-
rari. 165
The National Court of Appeals reference jurisdiction would be
comprised of cases sent down to it by the Supreme Court from the reg-
ular petitions for certiorari. 166 This category would contain those cases
which the Supreme Court is supposedly not deciding due to lack of
time. The Supreme Court would be authorized, in regard to any certio-
rari petition, to 1) retain the case for decision on the merits; 2) deny
certiorari and terminate the case; 3) deny certiorari and refer the case to
denials. See, e.g., Bailey v. Weinberger, 419 U.S. 953 (1974), where Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Stewart, stated: "It is a prime function of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction to
resolve precisely the kind of conflict here presented. ... Perhaps the state of our docket will not
permit us to resolve all disagreements between courts of appeals, or between federal and state
courts, and perhaps we must tolerate the fact that in some instances enforcement of federal law in
one area of the country differs from its enforcement in another. These situations, it is hoped, will
be few and far between." Id. at 953-54.
160. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-38.
161. Id. at 32-34.
162. Id. at 34-35.
163. Id. at 37.
164. Id. at 35.
165. Id. at 38-39.
166. Id. at 32.
Spring 1978] CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the NCA for a decision on the merits; or 4) deny certiorari and refer the
case to the NCA, giving that court discretion to terminate the litigation
or make a decision on the merits. 167 The Supreme Court would also be
authorized to refer cases within its obligatory jurisdiction, except those
which the Constitution requires it to accept, for decisions on the mer-
its. 168 Two important aspects of reference jurisdiction are; (1) that all
certiorari petitions would still be filed with the Supreme Court and, (2)
that all cases referred to the NCA for decision would again be subject
to Supreme Court review .y certiorari.
169
The system proposed by the Hruska Report would be substantially
similar to current court procedures. Petitions for certiorari would still
be filed with the Supreme Court, and appeals from the federal district
courts would continue to be taken to the circuit courts of appeals. The
difference to litigants would be the possibility of seeking a transfer or
being transferred from a circuit court or having a petition for certiorari
referred to the NCA. The reference provision would significantly en-
hance prospects for review since the Supreme Court would presumably
be referring to the NCA those petitions which it is presently denying.
170
The NCA could also curtail forum shopping, since consistency in the
law would ostensibly be improved.
The Hruska Commission proposals were less controversial than
those of the Freund Study Group, and in general provoked a much less
passionate response. 17 1 Criticism of the Hruska Court followed three
general lines. First, it was argued that this type of NCA would treat
only the symptoms of the problem, ignoring the actual caseload vol-
ume, and that symptomatic relief does not justify the creation of a new
court. 172 Secondly, many contend that cases transferred from the lower
courts to the National Court of Appeals that the NCA chose to hear
would often be cases which are not yet ripe for national decision. 173 In
other words, a case concerning a very important, very sensitive issue
.167. Id. at 32-33.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 38.
170. Id. at 33-34.
171. See note 8 supra.
172. See, e.g., Owens, supra note 8, at 606. See also, Miller, Proposed New "National Court
of Appeals," Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1976, § F, at 1, col. 1; Hearings II, supra note 8, at 1109
(remarks of Bazelon).
173. See Hearings I, supra note 8, at 175 (remarks of Goldberg); id. at 211 (remarks of
Friendly); id. at 512 (remarks of Stevens); Hearings II, supra note 8, at 699 (remarks of Aldisert);
id. at 793 (remarks of Field); id. at 907 (remarks of Lay). With the exception of Field, a Law
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, and former Justice Goldberg, all of the above are
federal judges.
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could arise in a circuit court and be transferred to the NCA. That court
would act in lieu of the circuit court but, while a circuit decision would
only bind one geographic area, the NCA decision would bind the
whole country. The Supreme Court would thus be left in the unenvi-
able position of having to either affirm, reverse or deny review in a case
which, if it had simply denied certiorari, would never have gone be-
yond circuit consideration. These specific criticisms may have had an
effect on the supporters of this form of NCA, since one of the two bills
currently before Congress does not contain a transfer jurisdiction pro-
vision. 174
The third major criticism involves a basic value judgment, with
those against a new court arguing that the problem of inter-circuit con-
flicts is overrated and that the appellate capacity is adequate for con-
temporary needs.175 Proponents of this view urge that consistency in
the national law is at best an illusory concept, and that the NCA would
add little in the way of concrete guidelines.
In terms of constitutional considerations, a thorough reading of
the Hruska Commission's Final Report shows that the Commission
scrupulously avoided the constitutional controversies touched off by
the Freund Study Group. The Hruska Court would not infringe upon
the sensitive issue of Supreme Court docket control, since the Supreme
Court would still review every petition for certiorari. Every effort was
made to preserve all of the current Supreme Court functions and du-
ties. However, such provisions have not stifled all of the constitutional
criticism; Eugene Gressman feels that a National Court of Appeals,
since it would be another court making nationally binding decisions,
would violate the proviso for one Supreme Court. 176 He also suggests
that this sort of broad restructuring of the courts is not within the con-
gressional ambit of power.177 Despite the fact that the constitutional
criticisms are not as much in the forefront as they were with the Freund
Report, the issue still remains. Apart from the various policy debates, it
must be determined whether this proposed National Court of Appeals
174. S. 3423, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
175. See Hearings I, supra note 8, at 211 (remarks of Friendly); id at 512 (remarks of Ste-
vens); Hearings If, .upra note 8 at 699 (remarks of Aldisert); id. at 753 (remarks of Leventhal);
id. at 808 (remarks of Coffin).
176. Hearings II, supra note 8, at 1319-24 (statement of Gressman). In his statement,
Gressman reiterated his views expressed in Gressman I, supra note 7, at 951. Gressman, co-
author with Robert Stem (a member of the Freund Study Group) of SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
(3rd ed. 1962), has been one of the foremost critics of both the Freund and Hruska proposals for
an NCA.
177. Hearings II, supra note 8, at 1319-21 (remarks of Gressman).
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would comply with the terms of the Constitution and whether Congress
possesses the power to make such a structural adjustment.
III. The Constitutional Issues
A. "One supreme Court"
"Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be in-
vested in one supreme Court. .. "178 The first sentence of article III,
section 1 captures the essence of the primary constitutional objection to
a National Court of Appeals, namely, that the NCA would assimilate
many Supreme Court functions and characteristics and thus create two
Supreme Courts in everything but name. In this view "one supreme
Court' is seen as meaning just that: no other court may share its essen-
tial functions without assuming its own "supreme" character. 79 This
constitutionally commanded singularity is thus seen as demanding that
only one voice set down the "supreme law of the land," and that that
one voice have but one jurisdiction and share its duties with no other
tribunal. Under this view, both the Freund and Hruska plans would
appear to be constitutionally invalid. The Freund plan would fail be-
cause of its provisions allowing the NCA to make final decisions, thus
becoming a second supreme authority, and giving the NCA the ability
to screen petitions for certiorari, thus controlling the Supreme Court's
single jurisdiction. The Hruska plan would be invalid because refer-
ence jurisdiction operates to share or delegate Supreme Court duties to
another court for nationally binding decisions, thus also sharing the
single jurisdiction.
As previously discussed, the early history of the Constitution pro-
vides little guidance in a search for original intentions. It is clear that
there were not to be two Supreme Courts, but that conclusion is justi-
fied only by the explicit language of the Constitution. Neither article
III itself nor the various original materials say anything regarding spe-
cial characteristics of the High Court that would make it and no other
supreme. The Judiciary Act of 1789, as the first embodiment of the
constitutional language, provides more guidance in the search for origi-
nal intent in regard to this precise term.
The "one supreme Court" of 1789 bears little resemblance to the
1978 version. The jurisdiction of the whole federal court system was
much narrower then than it is now, since all cases arose on direct ap-
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
179. See generally Black, supra note 7, at 885-87, Gressman I, szpra note 7, 960-64; Poe,
Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 7, at 855; Warren & Burger, supra note 7, at 729-30.
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peal and many were not even appealable to the Supreme Court. 80 It
was not until 1875 that Congress invested broad federal jurisdiction in
the national judiciary 8' and not until 1891 that the Circuit Act intro-
duced certiorari as a mechanism for discretionary Supreme Court re-
view. 1 82 It was true for many years that certain circuit court decisions
were not reviewable by the Supreme Court.' 83 Thus the original "one
supreme Court" functioned without provisions for discretionary re-
view, was unable to consider every case in the federal system, and did
not even have broad subject matter jurisdiction, due to the limited ca-
pacities of the lower federal courts. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
any one of these powers was perceived as being constitutionally man-
dated without having been apart of the framers' original Supreme
Court structure.
Objections to proposals for a National Court of Appeals may be
based more on policy considerations than on actual constitutional the-
ory. The concepts of discretionary review, broad federal jurisdiction
and the ability of the Supreme Court to hear all federal cases, all cur-
rently accepted as fundamental elements of judicial power, have their
origins in legislative efforts to improve judicial administration, not in
any deeply ingrained constitutional principles. While each addition to
Supreme Court practice has had its own effect, all of them taken to-
gether have broadened the scope of judicial authority and ensconced
the Supreme Court in its contemporary role. Viewing developments in
this area in their proper historical perspective is important because of
the ease with which a constitutional glaze can be affixed to well-ac-
cepted judicial methods and structures, a glaze which impairs a true
constitutional analysis of the issues raised by a National Court of Ap-
peals.
The Freund Report's National Court of Appeals, as envisioned by
its creators, would not create a second Supreme Court. The objections
raised against the court fall because of their overreliance on policy con-
siderations or because of misconceptions as to the NCA's perceived
role. There are two major, related criticisms which run through the ma-
jority of the anti-Freund commentary. The first refers to the NCA's
ability to screen all petitions for certiorari and forward to the Supreme
Court only those that it deems important enough for the Court's con-
sideration. It is claimed that the current ability of the Supreme Court to
180. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
181. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
182. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
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review all petitions for certiorari is a crucial aspect of the decision-mak-
ing process and that to strip the screening function away and invest it in
another court would involve a disturbance of the Supreme Court's con-
stitutional decision-making power.' 84 Related to this is the contention
that the NCA mandate requiring dismissal of petitions that are obvi-
ously controlled by precedent would preclude any Supreme Court re-
consideration of "settled areas," foreclosing the High Court's ability to
make decisions such as Baker v. Carr.'85 The second common criticism
focuses on the potential for a shared jurisdiction between the Supreme
Court and the National Court of Appeals which would theoretically
create more than one Supreme Court.'8 6 This objection goes to that
aspect of the proposal which would allow the National Court to make
some decisions on the merits without the possibility of any subsequent
Supreme Court review. It is claimed that such a proviso could eventu-
ally lead to two supreme courts in areas in which the NCA decided to
retain cases for its own decision. For example, were the National Court
to receive three labor law cases, pass one up and retain the other two,
there would be two courts of essentially concurrent jurisdiction making
nationally binding labor law decisions-and the Supreme Court would
be powerless to correct what it might think was an obviously miscreant
NCA decision. The crux of this second criticism is that the implementa-
tion of the Freund NCA would result in two courts sharing what the
one Supreme Court presently does, resulting in two supreme courts.
As for the contention that screening certiorari petitions is a funda-
mental part of the constitutional decision-making process, it seems
clear that this issue involves an allocation of judicial power well within
the purview of congressional authority. The entire process of discre-
tionary review was not conferred upon the Supreme Court until 1891
and was expanded to its present form only in 1925.187 The argument
that the Constitution requires a screening ability on the part of the
Supreme Court is somewhat strained when it is shown that the federal
court system operated without it for over 100 years. Congress first cre-
ated certiorari in 1891 to allow review of questionable circuit courts of
appeals decisions.'88 The use of the writ was expanded in 1925 to re-
184. See Gressman I, supra note 7, at 957-60; Hearings II, supra note 8, at 1322-24 (remarks
of Gressman); Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 7, at 855; Warren I, supra note 7, at 677-79.
185. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 16; Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, supra
note 7, at 851-53.
186. See Black, supra note 7, at 885; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 14-16; Gressman 1, supra
note 7, at 960-64; Warren I, supra note 7, at 678.
187. See notes 84-91, 111-14 and accompanying text supra.
188. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826.
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lieve the High Court of a tremendous burden on its appellate docket by
allowing the justices to pick and choose those cases they wished to
hear. '9 It may well be true that the use of the writ has now gone be-
yond these purposes to also include the timing of appeals as to when
they are ripe for review or to maintain a broad contact with all areas of
the federal law. Regardless of these changes, though, the entire screen-
ing process is one that was created for the courts by Congress, and it
would seem that if Congress so desired it could eliminate the writ alto-
gether without offending the Constitution.190 Of course the Freund
proposal makes no such drastic recommendation since it entrusts to an-
other court the power to decide which cases are most appropriate for
Supreme Court disposition. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court would hardly be decimated since the National Court would be
expected to forward a great many more petitions for review than the
Supreme Court would formally decide. The High Court would still de-
cide which cases it wished to hear, but the pool of supplicants would be
much smaller. 19
The contentions that the Freund NCA would frustrate the
Supreme Court's ability to change important precedents and that a
shared or concurrent jurisdiction would violate the concept of "one
supreme Court" both share a basic misconception of the roles to be
played by both the Supreme Court and the NCA within the appellate
system. As was previously mentioned, the NCA would be expected to
pass up many more petitions than the Supreme Court would ever fi-
nally decide; for example, 400 petitions would lead to 150 decisions.
192
The Freund Study Group did not intend that this forwarding process
would occur without strictures; they specifically mentioned in their re-
port that the whole process would be governed by guidelines set down
189. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936.
190. A more serious question might arise if Congress were to eliminate all appellate jurisdic-
tion by abolishing the writ of certiorari. This could be done by transferring all obligatory appeals
to the discretionary docket, which would make all appellate jurisdiction subject to writ of certio-
rari, and then abolishing the writ. Both Ratner and Hart would likely object to that change as an
impermissible interference with the Supreme Court's essential role in the governmental plan. See
notes 228-29 and accompanying text infra. On the other hand, Owen J. Roberts, shortly after
leaving the Supreme Court, argued that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to insure
-that Congress never take that very action. See Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme
Courtr' Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1, 3-4 (1949). See also National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting), where Justice Frankfurter
claimed that "Congress need not give this Court any appellate power." In any case, neither propo-
sal for an NCA seeks to eliminate Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.
191. FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, 21.
192. Id. at 21.
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by the Supreme Court in its rules. 193 These rules were to set forth crite-
ria both for referral to the Supreme Court and for NCA final decisions.
It was also expected that the Supreme Court would communicate its
intention in more frequent addenda to denials of certiorari from the
NCA. 194 The Study Group was very flexible in planning for ways in
which the Supreme Court constantly could communicate criteria for
the NCA reviewing process, and it was contemplated that any case in-
volving serious doubt would be forwarded to the High Court.195
These provisions seem to defuse the main points of the two criti-
cisms. It is true that without the opportunity for continual communica-
tion between the two courts the fears of the critics may well be realized.
In fact, without substantial Supreme Court guidelines, the National
Court could retain important decisions for itself and relegate others to
the Supreme Court, a course that would reverse the contemplated roles
of those two tribunals. Given the intended nature of the process, how-
ever, with its broad allowance of Supreme Court rulemaking, it is clear
that the Supreme Court could communicate a desire to rehear long-
standing precedent and could establish its intention to make all the im-
portant policy decisions in any given legal area. Any statute
implementing such an NCA would almost certainly stress the nature of
this relationship in its explicit terms. In addition to these guidelines, the
Freund Report would retain Supreme Court power to grant certiorari
before judgment in a Court of Appeals, before denial of review in the
NCA or before judgment in a case heard there. All of these provisions
taken together would seem to eliminate the concern over both non-
review of past cases and any concurrent jurisdiction.
196
193. Id. at 20-23.
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id. at 21. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 33; FreundI, supra note 7, at 143, Freund
1, supra note 7, at 1306-08. Freund, while allowing that the Supreme Court would communicate
its desires through the rule-making process and through comments made with denials of certio-
rari, argues that the NCA would not be in a position of pure "responsibility" but would also have
its own authoritative role. Id. at 1306. This authority would apparently be derived from the
NCA's ability to select cases for its own final review, since Bickel, also a Study Group member,
noted that "[Tihe loss [of control] would not be critical, especially since means are provided for
making the new National Court responsive to policy directions from the Supreme Court through
rules that the Supreme Court could issue to govern procedures and criteria of certification in the
National Court, and since the hierarchical position of the Supreme Court at the head of the fed-
eral judiciary would remain undisturbed. Means of communicating relevant attitudes of the
Supreme Court exist now and would remain available .... And the communications would be
heeded." A. BIcKEL, supra note 7, at 33. But see Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 7, at 851.
196. The failure of the Freund Study Group to explain thoroughly the specific ways the
Supreme Court would use the rule-making power, as well as the other methods of communication,
was a major defect in the proposal and the cause of much of the criticism directed against it.
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Despite the precedents of congressional willingness to entrust fi-
nality to lower courts, it has been urged that an NCA, because of its
ability to make final decisions of national law, would run afoul of the
Supremacy Clause. 7 That clause, which commands that the Constitu-
tion shall be the supreme law of the land, has been interpreted as neces-
sarily investing the power in the Supreme Court to guarantee
constitutional dominance and to provide a uniform body of federal law
in the federal court system.19 The criticism of the NCA stems from its
ability, along with the Supreme Court, to make national law, leading to
the possibility of two laws "made in pursuance of the Constitution"
that in a sense compete for supremacy. Despite some ambiguity in the
Constitutional Convention regarding the precise way to enforce the
Supremacy Clause,'99 the Supreme Court from a very early day as-
sumed the power to "state what the law is."' More specifically, the
Court has held that the Supremacy Clause is "clothed with judicial
power" and requires not only the settlement of constitutional questions
but the maintenance of a singular interpretation of the Constitution
and laws of the United States.20 1 The Court has thus cast the judicial
branch in the role of ultimate arbiter of the national law and of dis-
putes regarding constitutionality. In regard to a National Court of Ap-
peals, it must be determined whether the Supremacy Clause demands
that the Supreme Court act as its sole enforcement agent. While the
Supreme Court has undoubtedly viewed itself as the ultimate mecha-
nism by which the Clause is enforced, it has used, as in Marbury, more
general language regarding the duty of the "judiciary" and the "judi-
cial branch" to secure the supremacy of the Constitution and to say
what the law is. The difference in terminology, essentially one more of
form than substance, does place a different perspective on the
Supremacy Clause problem. The importance of the Clause lies not in
any intended Supreme Court role but rather, as its own language
clearly states, in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has assumed the duty of enforcing the Clause, but to
use the constitutional language to invest power in the Court is to miss
the point. The Clause requires constitutional preeminence, and the
197. See, e.g., Black, supra note 7, at 885; Gressman I, supra note 7, at 956; Poe, Schmidt &
Whalen, supra note 7, at 855.
198. See Ratner, supra note 12, at 160-65.
199. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.. 1, 20-22. See
generally A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT. PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 18-20, 47-49 (1962).
200. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
201. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517 (1858). See Ratner, supra note 12, at
166-68.
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Supreme Court has taken the position that the courts will enforce that
command, but it is the resultant supremacy, the power of the Court,
that is most important. There is arguably no great constitutional diffi-
culty if the Supreme Court alone does not make all the decisions so
long as the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws made under it
are maintained. The Freund Study Group's NCA, with its provisions
for Supreme Court direction and superintendence, would not so unduly
restrict the Supreme Court's unifying role that the supremacy of the
law would be threatened by two divergent constitutional interpreta-
tions. Under that plan, the High Court would maintain its function as
the ultimate arbiter.2"2
The Hruska Commission's "reference jurisdiction" also passes
constitutional muster. The critics contend that once the Supreme Court
accepts a case for review it may not delegate any portion of the deci-
sion-making process to another court without destroying its required
"oneness.' ' 203 In the first place, the ability of litigants to seek certiorari
from the NCA to the Supreme Court in the referred cases counters the
contention that reference jurisdiction can lead to two courts of shared
jurisdiction, as might be the case if the Supreme Court merely passed
along half of its business to the NCA for equally binding decisions.
Gressman argues that the constitutional convention's rejection of the
provision allowing "assignment of Supreme Court jurisdiction pre-
cludes the reference portion of the Hruska NCA jurisdiction. ' '2 4 The
wisdom of placing too much emphasis on language rejected by the con-
vention delegates is open to question, and, in any case, "assignment"
and "reference" may not even be analogous. In terms of a more con-
temporary understanding, it is significant that only a presidential veto
in 1892 prevented the enactment of a bill which would have alleviated
a Supreme Court backlog by assigning its arrearages to the circuit
courts.2 05 That legislation was rejected by President Harrison because it
allowed the Supreme Court too broad a review power in criminal cases,
which were just then beginning to be heard in that Court. Harrison also
desired that suits brought under the Indian Depredations Act be given
202. If one accepts the contentions of both the Freund and Hruska Reports regarding the
inability of the Supreme Court to resolve lower court conflicts, both NCA proposals might be
viewed as furthering the actual intent of the Supremacy Clause. Each would, by eliminating many
present inconsistencies in the national law, further the supremacy of that law without emasculat-
ing the ability of the Supreme Court to make changes in its determinations.
203. See Hearings II, supra note 8, at 1319-24.
204. Id. at 1321.
205. 23 CONG. REc. 5116 (1892).
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a direct route of appeal to the Supreme Court." 6 However, Harrison
raised no constitutional objections and none were mentioned in the de-
bates on the bill which was, of course, never passed upon by the courts.
Therefore, the Hruska NCA's provision for review of referred cases al-
leviates the primary constitutional objection of having two courts of
practically concurrent jurisdiction.
In conclusion, both plans for a National Court of Appeals appear
to fit within the "one supreme Court" language of article III. Elimina-
tion of total docket control by the removal of the screening function
under the Freund proposals is primarily a policy issue because discre-
tionary review by writ of certiorari is not a constitutional principle but
only a tool relatively recently given the Court by Congress. The same is
true of allowing other federal courts to make binding decisions without
Supreme Court review, again under the Freund proposals. Such a pol-
icy reflects a return to the early days of the federal judicial system and
offends no constitutional principle, especially when the Court retains a
mechanism by which it can exert its own policy prerogatives. Also, the
Supremacy Clause was not aimed at the intramural applications of the
national law but at state-federal interactions, and does not require the
Supreme Court to be its exclusive monitor. Finally, giving the Supreme
Court the capability of referring its cases to an NCA under the Hruska
plan enables that court to be a tribunal which will aid the Supreme
Court in utilizing its jurisdiction rather than one which would simply
share the High Court's duties and thus its identity.
B. An "Inferior" Court?
The Constitution, in both articles 1207 and 111,201 twice mentions
the congressional power to create inferior courts, and in article I specif-
ically speaks of "tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." One of the
important constitutional questions in conjunction with the creation of a
National Court of Appeals is whether such a court would truly be "in-
ferior" and thus within the constitutional ambit of congressional pow-
ers.20 9 The most significant problem in this regard is definitional;
namely, ascertaining the intended relationship between the federal
courts that will make some "inferior" and one "supreme." Since the
206. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 49, at 112.
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9: "To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."
(The clause is one in the list of congressional powers).
208. Id. at art. III, § 1: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
209. See National Court, supra note 7, at 290-312.
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precise meaning of the term "inferior" was not discussed at either the
constitutional convention or the state ratifying conventions, two other
indicators, the contemporary accepted meaning of the term in the
1700's and the embodiment of it in the Judiciary Act of 1789, lend the
most important insights.
There is some indication that common law courts, which were
classified as inferior and superior, were so categorized on a strictly ju-
risdictional basis.210 The courts having the broadest jurisdiction were
superior while those with limited jurisdiction were considered inferior.
Most inferior courts were also subject to some sort of supervision, but
not necessarily to review.2 1 It can be argued that the distinctions were
carried over into the new American court plan, and that inferior courts
would be those with limited jurisdiction, usually subject to some super-
vision. There was, however, no indication that the framers were work-
ing to copy a common law framework.2"2 The colonial courts provide
little guidance due to the disparate nature of each separate system.
Some dourts were designated as inferior or superior, but the functions
and jurisdiction of each varied from place to place.213 The early Ameri-
can experience and the history of the common law do suggest that in-
ferior courts were subordinate in some fashion, usually by the fact of at
least a limited scope of review, but are vague in terms of any specific
required relationship between the superior and inferior levels of courts.
The Act of 1789 provides more assistance in ascertaining the
meaning of "inferior." As noted earlier, the Act set up the Supreme
Court, three circuit courts and thirteen district courts. The lower courts,
presumably inferior, were of limited jurisdiction and subject to
Supreme Court review in some classes of cases. Judging from the spe-
cifics of that plan, "inferior" takes on the meaning alluded to by Alex-
210. See generally M. BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGL %ND 319-20 (1880) [here-
inafter cited as BIGELOW]; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37-*59 [hereinafter cited as
BLACKSTONE].
211. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 210, at *44, n.19, *36. See also NAational Court, supra note 7,
at 293.
212. Beyond incorporating any abstract legal principles into the plans for a new judiciary,
the framers seemed most concerned with countering the bad experience under the Articles of
Confederation. This was especially true in regard to arbitration between states and the need for a
national appellate court to handle the increasing number of admiralty cases. Frank, supra note 30,
at 8-9; Swindler, supra note 53, at 511-14.
213. See W. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 13-63 (1975); R.
POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 26-90 (1940). The concept of appeal was common in the
colonies, although there was no rigid separation of powers and the appeal often ended with the
governor or legislature. There were systems of courts through which appeals could progress, but
there was no labeling of such courts as inferior or superior. See Frank, supra note 30, at 4-7;
National Court, supra note 7, at 295; Swindler, supra note 53, at 504-07.
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ander Hamilton in Federalist 81, namely, that of a court possessed of a
"subordinate" relationship." 4 Hamilton had spoken of inferior courts
as tribunals subordinate to the supreme tribunal, and the Act did, by its
limited provisions for review, establish a system in which the lower
courts were subordinate. This relationship did not, however, encompass
total reviewability. In that regard, the 1789 structure resembled com-
mon law inferior courts, but analogies between the systems suffer from
the relatively strict, hierarchical design of the American courts with
their one supreme tribunal, a feature unknown at common law.21 5 The
most that can be gained from the 1789 Act is the knowledge that infer-
ior courts definitely did include courts of limited jurisdiction subject to
at least partial Supreme Court review.
The constitutional meaning of "inferior" has been discussed by the
Supreme Court in a series of disputes over circuit court jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, in Turner v. Bank of North America,21 6
stated that inferior courts as described in the Constitution were distinct
from the common law inferior courts. After noting this distinction, Ells-
worth stated that circuit courts were inferior courts in addition to being
courts of limited jurisdiction.217 Ellsworth said nothing of inferiority
requiring appellate subordination. It was not until 1809 that Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall explicitly drew that conclusion.
In Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy,2 18 Marshall stated that "[a]ll courts
from which an appeal lies are inferior courts in relation to the appellate
court before which their judgment may be carried, ...- 219 thus
strongly implying that appellate inferiority was a necessary component
of the general concept of inferior courts. The next year, in Durousseau
v. United States,2 20 Marshall was forced to explain a statute that estab-
lished a new district court without any provision for Supreme Court
review of that court's actions. Marshall assumed that Congress in-
tended that the review mechanics for the new court would match those
of the existing district courts; otherwise, he said "the court. . . would,
in fact, be a supreme court."22' On the surface, this language would
214. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 25, at 505-06.
215. See BIGELOW, supra note 210, at 19-146. The common law courts did have inferior and
superior elements, but there was no one court in that system that was supreme over all others,
although the House of Lords existed as titular head of the system. Id. See also National Court,
supra note 7, at 295.
216. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7 (1799).
217. Id. at 11.
218. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173 (1809).
219. Id. at 185.
220. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
221. Id. at 318.
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seem to equate inferiority with an ability to be reviewed, although
Marshall did not state that such would be required in the face of a
direct congressional command to the contrary.222 On the other hand, it
has been argued that Marshall's language about a court "otherwise be-
ing supreme" does mandate appellate inferiority as a condition neces-
sary to being an inferior court.
223
As is also true regarding the "exceptions and regulations" clause,
the actual boundaries or limitations on the congressional ability to cre-
ate inferior courts are not a subject of easy delineation due to the fact
that Congress has never made any extraordinary or even novel at-
tempts to test the extent of its constitutional power. There are no judi-
cial statements bearing directly on the subject because Congress has so
seldom deviated from the original court plan that no one has had cause
to test the scope of the power. While Marshall in Durousseau may have
implied that appellate inferiority was an essential element of the lower
federal courts, the issue was not specifically addressed, nor has any
later court considered the question. Other sources, however, indicate
that at least some appellate inferiority was a generally accepted charac-
teristic of the United States federal courts. The Act of 1789 provided a
limited appellate jurisdiction, and the most important early Supreme
Court Chief Justice, John Marshall, agreed. Despite these indications,
the actual elements of appellate inferiority remain undefined, and those
elements pose important problems in evaluating plans for a National
Court of Appeals.
It seems clear that the Hruska NCA would have little trouble with
the "inferior" court provision since NCA decisions would be review-
able in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. The Freund Court
presents more substantial problems in that none of its decisions on the
merits would be reviewable by the Supreme Court.224 The resolution of
the inferiority problem thus hinges on the classification of the process
of referring writs of certiorari. The potential defect of a lack of appel-
late inferiority could be cured by making all NCA decisions on the
merits appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. This
would not pose a substantial problem in light of the Study Group's
expectation that the number of cases so decided would be fairly
small.225 Such a provision would parallel the clear-cut area for review
possessed by the earlier "inferior" federal courts. Regardless of such an
222. Id. at 316-18.
223. See National Court, supra note 7, at 303.




amendment to the Freund Report, a strong case can be made for the
position that the NCA function of screening certiorari petitions for
Supreme Court review makes it sufficiently inferior to pass any consti-
tutional test.
The Freund National Court of Appeals would be expected to cer-
tify 400-500 writs of certiorari from which the Supreme Court would
choose cases for decision on the merits.226 Since the NCA would be
offering a wide category of cases to the Supreme Court for review while
not explicitly defining any areas of decision, and since the Supreme
Court would be free both to deal with the forwarded writs in any fash-
ion the justices desired and to state guidelines for the NCA selection
process, it seems that the NCA could comport with the Hamiltonian
view of inferiority, which is exemplified by a subordinate relationship.
An NCA that simply screened cases for ultimate Supreme Court dispo-
sition would be subordinate since the Supreme Court would continue
to make the binding, final decisions of national law, would retain the
power to reject cases it did not wish to hear, would continue to be the
final arbiter of important constitutional disputes, and would by virtue
of its rule-making power exert its policy directives on the "lower"
NCA. A properly functioning NCA would assume none of these func-
tions. It would simply make final decisions in areas deemed unworthy
of Supreme Court attention and forward broad classes of legitimate
writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The High Court would retain
its ultimate authority; the NCA would simply be a screening agent.
Such an NCA could in no way be deemed an equal of the Supreme
Court, and its functions seem clearly to be subordinate. Although the
Supreme Court would not be able to review that small category of final
NCA decisions, it would continually be reviewing the broad classifica-
tion process in the sense that it would be passing judgment on cases the
lower court thought worthy of its attention. Such a view arguably satis-
fies the presumed requirement of appellate inferiority. All of the func-
tions of the Freund NCA would be those of a subordinate, inferior
court, subject in practical consequence to appellate review by the
Supreme Court.
The only significant trouble with this National Court of Appeals
arises from a consideration of the court's negative potential. A deep
philosophical dispute with the Supreme Court might cause the NCA to
refuse to give the Supreme Court access to an area by either continually
denying petitions for review or by making its own final decisions in
226. Id. at 21-22.
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very important legal areas. Under the Freund proposal, the Supreme
Court would be powerless to act and the NCA might very well become
a supreme court in its own right because of its ability authoritatively to
define national law in any area it desired. However, the National Court
would not be designed to so operate; the very purpose of the NCA for-
warding 400-500 cases, from which approximately 150 decisions would
be made, would be to provide the Supreme Court with a wide berth of
discretion, and such a purpose would undoubtedly be established in the
NCA statute. It would also be alleviated by the Supreme Court's ability
to make policy directives. Yet, if this negative potential were truly
feared, the problem could be partially avoided by inserting a provision
for review of all NCA final decisions, ensuring no final NCA opinions
contrary to Supreme Court intentions. Of course, even with such a pro-
vision, the denials of certiorari would still be final, and this would pres-
ent the problem of the Supreme Court being unable to fully control its
docket. It is at this point, though, that the lessons of the history of the
federal judiciary must overcome any recently shaped conceptions about
the functions and characteristics of the Supreme Court. The possibility
of the Supreme Court not being able to rectify every lower court error
or hear every case in which it feels a need to make a decision was a
practical reality for the first 100 years of the judicial system. It was not
until relatively recent times that the Supreme Court attained the wide
scope of jurisdiction and broad docket discretion which it now enjoys.
The propriety of the policy alternatives must be kept a separate issue; it
should be remembered that a Supreme Court without full control over
the policy directions of its caseload is not without historical precedent.
A National Court of Appeals which has the potential for eliminating
categories of cases from Supreme Court consideration may not be the
most intelligent policy choice available to Congress, but it does not of-
fend the Constitution. A National Court of Appeals, making some de-
cisions over which the Supreme Court would have no control, would
still qualify as an inferior court by maintaining a subordinate relation-
ship with the Supreme Court, a relationship often characterized by
some form of reviewability or supervision. Such characteristics are
present in both the Freund and Hruska plans, and although the inferi-
ority of the Freund NCA would be fortified by a provision allowing for
review by certiorari from all final National Court opinions, this is not
constitutionally required.
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C. The Exceptions and Regulations Clause
Section 2. (2) In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Ju-
risdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under
such Regulations, as the Congress shall make.227
Considerations of the National Court of Appeals complying with
constitutional requirements of inferior courts or "one" Supreme Court
are in a sense only peripheral to the larger, central question of the
scope of the congressional power to mold and alter the federal courts.
Although the constitutional language seems to give Congress plenary
authority, scholars have inferred limitations on the legislative preroga-
tives to deal with the judiciary.228 In connection with a National Court
of Appeals, it has been argued that the congressional power may not be
used to disrupt "traditional Supreme Court functions" or the "role of
the Court in the constitutional plan,"2 29 and that any such disturbances
created by an NCA would thus be the result of Congress overstepping
its authority. If the clause is given a plenary interpretation, the power
to create a National Court in conformity with the other constitutional
requirements will not be a serious problem.
As was noted previously, the delegates to the constitutional con-
vention, while not expressly debating the "exceptions and regulations"
clause, did reject two provisions that arguably would have broadened
the scope of congressional power over the judiciary.230 The first, which
provided that "the judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as
the legislature shall direct," was rejected by the Committee on Detail as
an alternative to the exceptions clause. The second, which would have
allowed the legislature to assign any part of the Supreme Court's juris-
diction to any of the inferior courts, was originally drafted as an adden-
dum to the present clause, but rejected by a vote of the whole
convention. Both changes were made without debate or explanation,
but Gressman urges that they specifically undermine the use of the ex-
ceptions clause as authority for jurisdictional alterations such as the
Freund or Hruska proposals for an NCA.231
Apart from any consideration of the broad power assumed by or
227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
228. See Ratner, supra note 12, at 157-60. See generally Hart, supra note 12.
229. This argument builds on the limitations formulated by Hart and Ratner. See Gressman
, supra note 7, at 964-69; National Court, supra note 7, at 308-09.
230. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
231. Gressman I supra note 7, at 964-69; Hearings II, supra note 8, at 1320-21.
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acceded to Congress under the Clause,2 32 the convention's language al-
terations are a fragile basis on which to imply specific limitations of
congressional power. The leap from rejection of alternate language to
embodiment of constitutional prohibition is one not easily made, and,
lacking an explanation as to why the substitutions and rejections oc-
curred, one that probably should not be made at all. Given the complex
and often confused amendment process, more specific evidence of an
intended limitation is necessary before the language changes should be
used as strictures on congressional power. While rejection of jurisdic-
tional assignment or a limitation on the general congressional power
over the courts may have been contemplated, the delegates could also
have had several other purposes in mind. The first clause, which would
seemingly have given Congress unbridled discretion over the judicial
power, may have been thought to allow interference with the Court's
original jurisdiction. The delegates could also have felt that an assign-
ment provision was unnecessary in light of the Supreme Court's antici-
pated workload, or that, given the part of the clause authorizing
exceptions and regulations, any further delegation to Congress would
be either unnecessary or redundant. 233 The evidence needed to imply
intent to restrict congressional power in this area is simply not avail-
able, and it is especially necessary when the language actually adopted
seems to imply no limitations.234
The Constitution's advocates were required to defend the clause in
the Virginia ratifying convention. The meaning of the term "excep-
tions" was a particular issue, and John Marshall gave support to an
expansive view of the power when he said: "Congress is empowered to
make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the
Supreme Court. These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature
may think proper for the interest and liberty of the people.""3 5 William
Randolph, another advocate of the new plan, also spoke to a broad
meaning of the clause, saying: "It would be proper here to refer to any-
thing that could be understood in the federal court. They [Congress]
232. See note 249 infra.
233. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 12-13 n.46, where the language change is
deemed "largely rhetorical."
234. See Bice, An Essay Review of Congress v. Supreme Court, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 499
(1971). Criticizing the mode of analysis which relies essentially on original intent, Bice says:
Many of these arrangements may be merely the means to the ends the society seeks to
achieve by adoptin& the constitutional system. As conditions change, some of those
means may become incapable of achieving society's goals, and, thus, should give way to
arrangements which were not considered or even rejected when the basic document was
drafted.
Id. at 510 (footnotes omitted).
235. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 14, at 560.
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may except generally both as to law and fact, or they may except as to
the law only, or fact only. '236 As Van Alstyne points out, the many
scholarly investigations of the origins of the exceptions and regulations
clause do show that the founders generally had several uses and pur-
poses in mind when they drafted the language, but there is no indica-
tion that those purposes would mark the limitations of the power.
237
Federalists Marshall and Randolph showed by their remarks that a
broader interpretation was at least discussed and probably had other
support. Since Congress attempted nothing particularly drastic after
constructing the original court system, however, the framers were never
required to define the limits of the power.
Unlike the provisions for "one supreme Court" and "other inferior
courts," the exceptions and regulations clause has been the subject of
substantial judicial discussion. The most significant case in which the
power was discussed is Exparte McCardle.238 That controversy arose
in 1868 when McCardle, a newspaper editor in Mississippi, was con-
victed by a military tribunal for an offense under the Reconstruction
Acts. McCardle's writ of habeas corpus was rejected by the circuit
court, and McCardle petitioned the Supreme Court-for review of that
decision under a 1867 provision giving the Court the power to review
habeas corpus cases.23 9 The Court heard the case in 1868 and took it
under advisement due to the absence of Chief Justice Chase, who was
then presiding over President Johnson's impeachment trial. Before the
Court could issue an opinion, Congress, fearful that the Court might
utilize the occasion to declare the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional,
repealed the 1867 legislation24° to remove the Court's jurisdiction and
require it to dismiss the case. Chase, speaking for a unanimous court,
stated:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the Legis-
lature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution;
and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this
court is given by express words.
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before
us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause. 2
41
236. Id. at 572.
237. Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 261.
238. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
239. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
240. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
241. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514.
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The Supreme Court, by thus acceding to the alteration of its jurisdic-
tion, seemingly constitutionalized the principle of broad congressional
power utilized through the exceptions and regulations clause.
McCardle has been anything but a popular decision.242 The
Supreme Court could have heard the case via a route offered in the
1789 Act rather than simply looking at the power given by Congress in
1867,243 and the Court did use very broad language to deal with what
could have been a very narrow question. More specifically, there was
no need to discuss the "exceptions and regulations" power because
Congress in this instance had only withdrawn a route of review previ-
ously extended. In other words, it can be argued that the case did not
involve a true exception to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
but rather only a removal of one route of review, and thus that the
Supreme Court did not need to discuss the ability of Congress to make
exceptions.244
Despite these critical reevaluations of the decision, the McCardle
Court did choose to discuss the exceptions power and did give it a very
broad interpretation. In regard to that holding, McCardle was hardly
an historical anomaly, and its broad language has continued to be cited
with approval. In a series of earlier cases, Chief Justices Marshall, Ells-
worth and Taney, while claiming that the principle of appellate juris-
diction has its basis in the Constitution, noted also that the particulars
of the power are the absolute and total responsibility of Congress. 245
.So, in an historical sense, McCardle was only the reiteration of a previ-
ously held judicial principle. Cases subsequent to McCardle follow the
pattern, citing the case to bolster very broad recognitions of congres-
sional power to alter both the structure and jurisdiction of federal
courts. 2 4 6
242. For critical discussions of McCardle, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME
COURT 286-89 (1969); Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations Clause Cf Article III anda Per-
son's Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter be Limited by Congressional Power Under the Former?,
72 W. VA. L. REv. 238, 246-51 (1970); Hart, supra note 12, at 1364-65; Lenoir, supra note 12, at
20-30; Ratner, supra note 12, at 160-67.
243. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
244. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 244-48.
245. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-20 (1847); United States v. More, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 159-73 (1805); Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 327 (1796).
246. See, e.g. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 567 (1962). Dissenting in Glidden, Justice Douglas stated that it was doubtful that McCardle
could command a "contemporary majority," id. at 605 n.11, but concurring in the later FRast
decision, Justice Douglas stated. "As respects our appellate jurisdiction, Congress may largely
fashion it as Congress desires by reason of the express provisions of § 2, Article III. See Exparte
McCardle .... " 392 U.S. at 109. The lower federal courts have continued to cite McCardle for
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The concept of an unchecked Congress in the field of appellate
jurisdiction has spurred a search for ways in which that power can be
limited. Professors Ratner and Hart concluded that congressional limi-
tations of appellate jurisdiction must stop short of destroying the
"Court's role in the constitutional plan."'247 The Court's role would
thus be exemplified by the ability (1) to declare the supreme law of the
land; (2) to provide for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent lower
court interpretations of federal law; and (3) to ensure the supremacy of
federal law over state law. 48 However, while the preservation of such a
Supreme Court role may well be a valid policy alternative, there is no
specific judicial language supporting a theory that Congress is so lim-
ited in exercising its powers. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has
often seemed to embrace the concept that the congressional role in this
area is without significant strictures. 249
Apart from any considerations of "role preservation," more defini-
tive limitations on this congressional power may be found in other lan-
guage of the Constitution. For instance, Congress may except from and
regulate the appellate jurisdiction, but it may not create more than one
Supreme Court while so doing. More important, as Van Alstyne points
out, the Fifth Amendment guarantees of equal protection and due pro-
cess may not be impaired by any congressional exceptions and regula-
the proposition of broad congressional power through the exceptions and regulations clause. See,
ag., Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699, 701 (6th Cir.
1976); Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 486 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1973); Drake v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 50, 443 F.2d 101, 102 (8th Cir. 1971); Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197, 438 F.2d
1128, 1135-36 (3rd Cir. 1975).
247. Hart, supra note 12, at 1364-65; Ratner, supra note 12, at 201-02.
248. Ratner, supra note 12, at 160-67.
249. See, e.g., Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865): "In order to create
such appellate jurisdiction in any case, two things must concur. the Constitution must give the
capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must supply the requisite authority." Earlier, Justice
Daniel had stated that the judicial power, except for original jurisdiction,
is dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, en-
tirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creatin& tribunals [in-
ferior to the Supreme Court] for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them
with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good.
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). In Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119
(1847), Chief Justice Taney stated "[b]y the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court
possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of Congress." See also
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting): "Congress need not establish inferior courts; Congress need not grant the full scope of
jurisdiction which it is empowered to vest in them; Congress need not give this Court any appel-
late power, it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it may do so even while a
case is sub judice. Exparle MeCardle. "But see Ratner, supra note 12, at 168-83.
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tions. 250 Van Alstyne argues that that the due process clause requires a
judicial hearing conforming to Supreme Court requisites of fairness;
but that Congress need not provide for a hearing or appeal to the
Supreme Court itself.
251
Nearly all of the commentary concerning the limits of the excep-
tions and regulations clause and the continued validity of Exparte
McCardle were the result of various congressional threats to the
Supreme Court's subject matter jurisdiction.252 When compared to
those proposals, such as cutting off review of all apportionment deci-
sions, the suggestions for a National Court of Appeals pale in signifi-
cance. Regardless of which interpretation of McCardle is accepted,
neither NCA proposal would be outside the congressional scope of
power. Both plans would comport with the rest of the Constitution and
both would also seem to comply with Ratner's description of the proper
Supreme Court role in the governmental plan, since the supremacy of
the federal law would not be threatened and the ultimate resolution of
lower court conflicts would actually be increased. Given the broad con-
tours consistently attributed to Congress in this area by the Supreme
Court, the creation of either form of a National Court of Appeals
would certainly be a permissible regulation of appellate jurisdiction
and not outside the bounds of congressional authority. The exceptions
and regulations power seems much broader than it need be to sustain
this sort of legislation, and the exact limits of the authority, if any, may
not be determined until a much more drastic reform is brought into
question. It is enough to note here that the long string of precedents for
a broad interpretation of congressional authority would sustain these
types of NCA's and perhaps other, more extraordinary reforms as well.
Conclusion
The various proposals for the creation of a National Court of Ap-
peals have stimulated much discussion, most of which has assessed the
validity of the need for an NCA, the propriety of that type of structural
reform and the proper role of the judiciary in American politics. The
entire sequence is, of course, one that has been witnessed many times
before. The debates over circuit riding, the new circuit court system
and the implementation of discretionary docket control all involved as-
250. Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 268.
251. Id. at 268-69.
252. See generally, Hart, supra note 12; Merry, Scope of the Supreme Courtr AppellateJuri-




sessments of the judicial workload and reflections on judicial function
and structure. All were marked by a general congressional procrastina-
tion, and all eventually did require at least some change in conceptions
about the role of the courts. The demise of circuit riding forced aban-
donment of the notion that judges must obtain a feel for local law
before making intelligent determinations of national law. The Circuit
Act of 1891 required an even more fundamental change, as cases that
had previously been entitled to adjudication in the Supreme Court
were given to the new circuit courts for final judgment, subject only to
discretionary Supreme Court review. The Judges' Bill of 1925 ex-
panded the concept of discretionary review begun by the Circuit Act,
and thus further changed the role of the Supreme Court by endowing it
with a selective decision-making power rather than the more basic duty
of deciding all cases that properly gravitate through the federal court
system.
Without evaluating the status of the current Supreme Court
caseload "crisis," the similarities to previous debates are very evident.
Although there is a general consensus that the workload presents some
problem, major disagreements continue regarding its relative serious-
ness, and thus the debate takes place with no great sense of urgency.
The Freund and Hruska proposals have been criticized because they
would deprive the Supreme Court of its essential functions and unac-
ceptably alter the respective roles of the courts within the federal sys-
tem. This latest debate, however, has produced a new twist in its
contention that the Freund and Hruska proposals would also be uncon-
stitutional. A claim of unconstitutionality raises important questions
about the possible limitations on congressional ability to make both
structural and jurisdictional changes in the federal court system, and, if
the claim is valid, place significant obstacles in the way of any reform
of an overburdened judiciary.
Viewed against the historical development of the federal judiciary
and the actual constitutional requirements for a Supreme Court,
though, this contention seems more analogous to the prior policy con-
cerns over judicial function than to any real constitutional claims, and
both the Freund and Hruska proposals would thus appear to be within
the constitutional framework. The Constitution does provide that there
be "one supreme Court" and other "inferior Courts" as Congress sees
fit to establish. It also gives Congress the power to make exceptions to
and regulations of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. That lat-
ter power would be the basis for any congressional creation of an NCA,
and although the extent of power given under the exceptions clause is
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an unsettled question, this type of reform would not appear to test its
outer limits. For instance, under the current NCA proposals, there
would be no deprivation of specific jurisdictional powers, no emascula-
tion of current Supreme Court functions and no attempt by Congress to
control the outcome of certain types of cases-all examples of the type
of situation that defenders of the Court might claim are not allowed by
a "proper" reading of the constitutional language. There is instead a
congressional attempt, regardless of its logical soundness, to improve
judicial administration by changing the structure of the courts. Such a
plan would seem well within the exceptions power providing that the
reform as adopted respects other constitutional provisions such as the
requirement of "one supreme Court." Considerations of an NCA in
light of the "one supreme Court" and other "inferior Courts" language
are basically interrelated due to the fact that the concept of a non-
supreme court would seem to include the concept of inferiority. In any
case, it seems clear that any plan for an NCA that allows Supreme
Court review or supervision would require the NCA to be an inferior
court since the NCA would be subject, in some degree, to the control of
another tribunal. It also seems clear that any such plan would not per-
mit the new tribunal to be supreme, since the original Supreme Court
would continue to be the ultimate authority, and while perhaps not re-
viewing every case arising from the lower federal courts, would still
exert its own political and judicial preferences.
Apart from these specific arguments, the general contention that
the one Supreme Court concept is violated by any deprivation of total
Supreme Court control over the entire federal court system, aside from
not being able to command much historical support, also seems to suf-
fer from a type of structural tunnel vision. The ultimate concern in
regard to the federal judiciary should not be the precise role of the
Supreme Court in the judicial framework but the health and status of
the national law. Although it is desirable that the Supreme Court pos-
sess certain capabilities in order to maintain a meaningful role in the
system, the particular powers of the Court should not be the central
concern. The framers provided for one Supreme Court because of their
experience with the Articles of Confederation and the perceived need
for a tribunal of national authority to ultimately settle questions of na-
tional importance. The intention was not that the one Supreme Court
be possessed of certain powers so as to maintain a coherent national
law, but that the national law be so maintained by the whole federal
judiciary. So long as that goal is accomplished, and the judicial needs
of the country are properly served, the essential constitutional mandate
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will be satisfied. It is true that maintenance of the national law requires
a Supreme Court that is generally capable of overseeing the bounds of
the system, but the Supreme Court is not required to see every petition
for review or make every final decision. Simply stated, the proper focus
of constitutional inquiry should be more on the state of the law than on
the powers of any specific tribunal. The state of that law relies heavily
on the abilities of the Supremie Court to supervise generally, but a plan
that allows that Court a more detached control and that also, by its
creation of an expanded appellate capacity, adds a larger degree of cer-
tainty to the national law would seem to command a large degree of
constitutional authority. The most basic reason for giving Congress
power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was to ensure
the maintenance of this legal stability, allowing a structuring of the
courts best suited for contemporary judicial needs. Although the found-
ing fathers could hardly have been expected to anticipate the present
day complexities of the inferior federal court system, Alexander Hamil-
ton did speak to the congressional authority to promote the mainte-
nance of the principles underlying the new judicial system:
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judici-
ary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are all
conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the
structure of that department and which were necessary to the perfec-
tion of the system. If some partial inconveniences should appear to
be connected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan it
ought to be recollected that the national legislature will have ampleauthority to make such excepftions and to provide such regulations as
will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The
possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well in-
formed mind, as a solid objection to a general principle which is cal-
culated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain general
advantages.253
It would be rather anomalous if at the same time the current dock-
et situation deteriorated to the point where the Supreme Court was be-
set by an avalanche of petitions for review, the lower courts produced
an ever-increasing number of conflicting decisions and relief proposals
such as an NCA were rejected because they diminished Supreme Court
control and usurped contemporary Supreme Court functions. The
strange result would be to cling to a "constitutional" conception of
"one supreme Court" while tolerating a situation quite similar to the
very scenario the framers had sought to avoid.
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 25, at 501.
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